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Large	  merger	  and	  acquisition	  (M&A)	  samples	  feature	  the	  pervasive	  presence	  of	  repetitive	  acquirers.	  
They	   offer	   an	   attractive	   empirical	   context	   for	   revealing	   the	   presence	   of	   acquirer	   skills	   (persistent	  
superior	  performance).	  But	  panel	  data	  M&A	  are	  quite	  heterogeneous;	  just	  a	  few	  acquirers	  undertake	  
many	  M&As.	  Does	  this	  feature	  affect	  statistical	   inference?	  To	  investigate	  the	  issue,	  our	  study	  relies	  
on	  simulations	  based	  on	  real	  data	  sets.	  The	  results	  suggest	  the	  existence	  of	  a	  bias,	  such	  that	  extant	  
statistical	   support	   for	   the	   presence	   of	   acquirer	   skills	   appears	   compromised.	   We	   introduce	   a	   new	  
resampling	  method	  to	  detect	  acquirer	  skills	  with	  attractive	  statistical	  properties	  (size	  and	  power)	  for	  
samples	   of	   acquirers	   that	   complete	   at	   least	   five	   acquisitions.	   The	   proposed	  method	   confirms	   the	  
presence	  of	  acquirer	  skills	  but	  only	   for	  a	  marginal	   fraction	  of	   the	  acquirer	  population.	  This	  result	   is	  
robust	   to	   endogenous	   attrition	   and	   varying	   time	   periods	   between	   successive	   transactions.	   Claims	  
according	   to	   which	   acquirer	   skills	   are	   a	   first	   order	   factor	   explaining	   acquirer	   cross-­‐sectional	  
cumulated	  abnormal	  returns	  appears	  overstated.	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Do	   some	   acquirers	   persistently	   display	   superior	   performance?	   This	   question	   is	   important,	  
because	  such	  persistence	  implies	  the	  existence	  of	  acquisition	  skills,	  achieved	  through	  the	  acquirer’s	  
culture,	  history,	  expertise,	  management	  style,	  or	  access	  to	  funding	  sources;	  skills	  that	  are	  difficult	  for	  
other	   firms	   to	   replicate.	   Firms	  missing	   this	   expertise	   should	   then	   focus	  on	   internal	   innovation	   and	  
organic	  growth.	  
A	  pervasive	   feature	  of	   the	  market	   for	  corporate	  control	   is	   the	  presence	  of	   repetitive	  acquirers.	  
According	  to	  Aktas	  et	  al.	  (2012),	   in	  a	  sample	  of	  321,610	  merger	  and	  acquisition	  (M&A)	  transactions	  
between	   1992	   and	   2009,	   approximately	   25%	   involved	   acquirers	   that	   had	   undertaken	   at	   least	   five	  
acquisitions	   during	   that	   period.	   These	   repetitive	   acquirers	   create	   a	   panel	   data	   structure	   in	   M&A	  
samples,	  offering	  a	  rich	  opportunity	  to	  test	  various	  theories	  and	  predictions.	  For	  example,	  Schipper	  
and	   Thompson	   (1983)	   and	   Malatesta	   and	   Thompson	   (1985)	   investigate	   investors’	   anticipation	   of	  
acquisition	   programs.	   Referring	   to	   the	   hubris	   hypothesis	   (Roll,	   1986)	   and	   data	   that	   show	   that	  
acquirers’	   cumulative	   abnormal	   returns	   (CAR)	   decline	   during	   acquisition	   programs	   (Fuller	   et	   al.,	  
2002),	  several	  authors	  argue	  that	  repetitive	  acquirers	  develop	  overconfidence	  (e.g.,	  Billett	  and	  Qian,	  
2008),	   though	   Aktas	   et	   al.	   (2009)	   question	   whether	   a	   declining	   CAR	   is	   unambiguous	   evidence	   of	  
hubris.	  Hayward	  (2002)	  also	  examines	  the	  conditions	  in	  which	  firms	  develop	  acquisition	  experience.	  	  
Building	  on	  an	  econometric	  approach	  designed	  by	  Bertrand	  and	  Schoar	  (2003;	  B&S	  hereafter)	  to	  
test	   for	   the	   presence	   of	   a	   particular	  management	   style,	   some	   studies	   also	   have	   begun	   addressing	  
acquirer	   skills	   (Golubov	   et	   al.,	   2015).	   This	   setup	   relies	   on	   CEO	   fixed	   effects	   (FE),	   such	   that	   B&S	  
interpret	  significant	  CEO	  FE	  as	  evidence	  of	  a	  management	  style.	  In	  particular,	  they	  focus	  on	  changes	  
in	  the	  R-­‐square	  and	  adjusted	  R-­‐square	  values	  when	  switching	  from	  a	  classical	  ordinary	  least	  squares	  
(OLS)	  estimator	   to	   the	  data	  panel	  FE	   least	  squares	  dummy	  variable	   (LSDV)	  estimator,	  as	  well	  as	  on	  
Fisher	  test	  of	  the	  joint	  significance	  of	  FE	  (FE	  Fisher	  Statistic).	  Yet	  the	  importance	  they	  attribute	  to	  the	  
R-­‐square	  and	  adjusted	  R-­‐square	   values	   is	  puzzling.	   	   These	   statistics	   are	   indeed	  most	  often	  used	  as	  
goodness	  of	  fit	  measures,	  not	  statistical	  tests.	  Even	  if	  asymptotic	  distributions	  exist,	  these	  depend	  on	  
unknown	   parameters	   (see	   Ohtani,	   2000).	   Moreover,	   without	   a	   clear	   null	   hypothesis,	   the	  
interpretation	  of	  their	  results	  is	  ambiguous.	  It	  is	  worthwhile	  also	  to	  note	  that	  statistical	  findings	  using	  
the	  R-­‐square	  or	  the	  adjusted	  R-­‐square	  offer	  no	  insights	  into	  the	  sign	  associated	  with	  skills	  (i.e.,	  under-­‐	  
or	   over-­‐performance).	   The	   FE	   Fisher	   test	   has	   the	   potential	   to	   reject	   the	   clearly	   defined	   null	  
hypothesis	  of	  no	  acquirer	  skills	  though.	  	  
In	   the	   specific	   case	   of	   M&A	   sample	   the	   data	   sets	   are	   panel	   data	   sets	   strongly	   unbalanced,	  
characterized	  by	  attrition	  as	  defined	  in	  Wooldridge	  (2002).	  For	  example,	  in	  Aktas	  et	  al.’s	  (2012)	  very	  
large	  sample,	  more	   than	  50%	  of	   the	   transactions	   involve	  acquirers	   that	  make	  only	  one	  acquisition.	  
The	  CAR	  cross-­‐sectional	  variation	  of	  one-­‐time	  acquirers	  then	  can	  be	  captured	  fully	  and	  mechanically	  
by	  an	  FE	  estimator.	  But	  does	  this	  attrition	  pattern	  affect	  the	  R-­‐square,	  adjusted	  R-­‐square,	  and	  Fisher	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test?	   To	   what	   extent	   does	   it	   contaminate	   empirical	   findings?	   In	   addition	   to	   answering	   these	  
questions,	  we	  seek	  an	  alternative	  testing	  procedure	  for	  detecting	  acquirer	  skills	  that	  might	  be	  more	  
robust	  to	  the	  specific	  attrition	  pattern.	  	  
To	   do	   so,	   our	   analyses	   use	   a	   sample	   of	   12,707	   transactions	   completed	   during	   1990–2011	   by	  
4,507	   unique	   acquirers.	   Our	   sample	   selection	   criteria	   match	   those	   of	   Golubov	   et	   al.	   (2015):	  
domestically	   controlled	   transactions,	   public	   acquirers,	   targets	   of	   all	   statuses	   (public,	   private,	  
subsidiaries),	  completed	  transactions,	  deal	  value	  of	  at	  least	  US	  $1	  million	  as	  reported	  in	  the	  Thomson	  
Securities	   Data	   Company	   (SDC)	   database,	   relative	   transaction	   size	   at	   least	   equal	   to	   1%,	   and	   no	  
financial	   industries	   (standard	   industrial	   classification	   [SIC]	   codes	   6000–6999).	   Our	   sample	   includes	  
27.11%	   fully	   cash-­‐paid	  deals	  and	  15.99%	  public	   targets.	  The	  average	  deal	   value	   is	  US$	  377	  million,	  
and	   the	  average	  acquirer	  CAR	   is	  1.71%.	  These	   statistics	  are	  all	   consistent	  with	  previous	   reports	  on	  
similar	  sample	  types	   (e.g.,	  Moeller	  et	  al.,	  2004).	  Of	   the	  4,507	  unique	  acquirers,	  1,859	  are	  one-­‐time	  
acquirers	   (41.25%),	  whereas	   781	   (17.33%)	   engaged	   in	   at	   least	   five	   transactions	   during	   1990–2011.	  
These	  two	  figures	  highlight	  the	  strong	  attrition	  in	  this	  typical	  M&A	  data	  set.	  
To	   assess	   the	   influence	   of	   attrition	   on	   inferences	   based	   on	   the	   B&S	   approach,	   we	   conducted	  
simulation	  studies,	  in	  the	  style	  of	  Brown	  and	  Warner	  (1985;	  B&W	  hereafter),	  using	  our	  M&A	  sample	  
and	   adding	   simulated	   acquirer	   skills.	   We	   manipulate	   the	   attrition	   pattern	   of	   the	   generated	  M&A	  
samples,	  that	  is,	  the	  percentage	  of	  acquirers	  that	  complete	  a	  particular	  number	  of	  transactions.	  For	  
example,	  we	  simulate	  samples	  in	  which	  63.21%	  of	  acquirers	  are	  one-­‐time	  acquirers,	  23.26%	  are	  two-­‐
time	   acquirers,	   8.56%	   are	   three-­‐time	   acquirers,	   and	   so	   on.	   In	   seven	   attrition	   patterns	   (Figure	   1),	  
attrition	   in	  the	  number	  of	  transactions	  shifts	   from	  a	  rapid	  pace	  (right-­‐skewed	  attrition),	  as	  typically	  
observed	  for	  M&A	  samples,	  to	  a	  slow	  pace	  (left-­‐skewed	  attrition).	  Thus	  we	  can	  examine	  the	  impact	  
of	   panel	   attrition	   on	   the	   ability	   to	   detect	   acquirer	   skills.	   Each	  M&A	   transaction	   also	   is	   assigned	   a	  
random	  acquirer	  skill	  level,	  drawn	  from	  a	  zero	  mean	  Gaussian	  distribution	  with	  a	  given	  variance.	  This	  
skill	   applies	   to	   all	   transactions	   by	   a	   given	   acquirer	   (i.e.,	   perfectly	   persistent).	   The	   variance	   of	   the	  
Gaussian	  distribution	  then	  drives	  the	  importance	  and	  heterogeneity	  of	  skills	  in	  the	  acquirer	  sample.	  
We	  regress	  the	  acquirer	  CAR	  on	  acquirer	  fixed	  effects	  (FE)	  and	  the	  set	  of	  control	  variables	  suggested	  
by	  Golubov	  et	  al.	  (2015),	  then	  analyze	  the	  behavior	  of	  the	  FE	  Fisher	  test.	  We	  report	  also	  R-­‐square	  and	  
adjusted	   R-­‐square	   values,	   to	   parallel	   existing	   literature.	  We	   repeat	   this	   process	   1,000	   times,	   with	  
different	  combinations	  of	  the	  variances	  of	  abnormal	  returns	  and	  attrition	  patterns.	  In	  turn,	  we	  offer	  
three	  key	  insights.	  
First,	   in	   the	   absence	   of	   simulated	   acquirer	   skills,	   when	   switching	   from	   the	   OLS	   to	   the	   LSDV	  
estimator,	  the	  R-­‐square	  value	  increases	  dramatically	  in	  case	  of	  right-­‐skewed	  attrition.	  With	  the	  LSDV	  
estimator,	   the	   R-­‐square	   is	   only	   weakly	   reactive	   to	   the	   importance	   of	   simulated	   skills	   with	   right-­‐
skewed	   attrition.	   We	   conclude	   that	   the	   observation	   of	   an	   increase	   in	   the	   R-­‐square	   value	   when	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switching	  from	  OLS	  to	  LSDV	  cannot	  reveal	  insights	  into	  the	  presence	  or	  absence	  of	  acquirer	  skills	   in	  
typical	  M&A	  samples.	  
Second,	  again	   in	  the	  absence	  of	  simulated	  acquirer	  skills,	   the	   increase	   in	  the	  adjusted	  R-­‐square	  
value	   that	   results	   from	   the	   switch	   from	   the	   OLS	   to	   the	   LSDV	   estimator	   is	   limited.	  With	   the	   LSDV	  
estimator,	   the	   adjusted	  R-­‐square	   is	  moreover	  more	   reactive	   to	   the	   importance	   of	   simulated	   skills,	  
independently	  of	  the	  attrition	  pattern.	  Thus,	  it	  is	  more	  suited	  to	  detect	  acquirer	  skills	  than	  R-­‐square	  
is.	  But,	  as	  mentioned	  here	  above,	  the	  adjusted	  R-­‐square	  is	  essentially	  goodness	  of	  fit	  measure,	  with	  
an	  asymptotic	  distribution	  depending	  on	  unknown	  parameters,	   that	  offer	  therefore	  a	   limited	  route	  
to	   test	   statistical	   evidence	   of	   the	   presence	   of	   acquirer	   skills.	   It	   also	   is	   silent	   about	   the	   sign	   of	   the	  
detected	  skills.	  
Third,	   the	   FE	   Fisher	   Statistic,	   similar	   to	   the	   adjusted	   R-­‐square,	   displays	   reactivity	   to	   the	  
importance	   of	   simulated	   skills.	   Yet	   our	   B&W	   simulations	   highlight	   that	   the	   FE	   Fisher	   Statistic	   size	  
depends	  on	   the	  attrition	  pattern.	   In	  a	   case	  of	   right-­‐skewed	  attrition	   (as	   typically	  observed	   in	  M&A	  
samples),	   the	  FE	  Fisher	  Statistic	   is	  vastly	  over-­‐sized:	   in	   the	  absence	  of	  simulated	  acquirer	  skills,	   the	  
null	  hypothesis	  of	  no	  acquirer	  skills	  is	  rejected	  far	  too	  often,	  according	  to	  the	  chosen	  confidence	  level	  
(type	   I	   error).	   Therefore,	   the	  use	  of	   the	   FE	   Fisher	   test	   to	   detect	   acquirer	   skills	   leads	   to	   potentially	  
strongly	  biased	  inferences.	  
Reflecting	   these	   findings	   regarding	   the	  FE	  Fisher	  Statistic	   size	   issue	  and	   the	  extent	   to	  which	  FE	  
estimation	   precision	   depends	   on	   the	   number	   of	   acquisitions	   by	   the	   acquirer,	   we	   propose	   a	   new	  
resampling-­‐based	  method	   to	   detect	   acquirer	   skills	   and	   designated	   as	   RBSD	   for	   Resampling	   Based	  
Method	  for	  Skills	  Detection.	  It	  builds	  on	  a	  simple	  idea:	  reconstruct	  balanced	  panels	  for	  each	  number	  
of	   acquisitions	   by	   an	   acquirer.	   By	   construction,	   the	   generated	   M&A	   samples	   display	   no	   more	  
attrition.	  We	  then	  analyze	  the	  size	  and	  power	  of	  RBSD	  using	  the	  set	  of	  B&W	  simulations	  adopted	  for	  
the	  B&S	  procedure.	  Here	   again,	   some	   clear	   conclusions	   emerge:	   the	   FE	   Fisher	   Statistic	   is	   correctly	  
sized,	   even	   if	   the	   sample	   displays	   right-­‐skewed	   attrition.	   In	   the	   power	   analysis	   (i.e.,	   ability	   of	   the	  
RBSD	  FE	   Fisher	   Statistic	   to	   reject	   the	  absence	  of	   acquirer	   skills	   in	  presence	  of	   simulated	   skills),	  we	  
observe	   that	   power	   increases	   with	   the	   number	   of	   acquisitions	   by	   acquirer,	   which	   is	   as	   expected,	  
because	   skills	   by	   definition	   are	   based	   on	   persistence.	   Power	   also	   is	   increasing	   in	   the	   level	   of	  
simulated	  skills.	  Therefore,	   the	  RBSD	  FE	  Fisher	  Statistic	  appears	   to	  be	  a	  valid	  statistical	   test	   for	   the	  
presence	  of	  acquirer	  skills	  in	  a	  real-­‐world	  M&A	  sample.	  	  
Applying	   the	   RBSD,	   we	   finally	   test	   for	   the	   presence	   of	   acquirer	   skills	   in	   our	   M&A	   sample.	   It	  
confirms	   the	   presence	   of	   acquirer	   FE:	   At	   a	   10%	   confidence	   level,	   for	   balanced	   samples	   of	   5	  
acquisitions	   per	   acquirer,	   in	   88.20%	   of	   the	   generated	   samples,	   we	   can	   reject	   the	   absence	   of	  
significant	  acquirer	  FE.	  At	  5%	  and	  1%	  confidence	   levels,	   the	  corresponding	  percentages	  are	  73.50%	  
and	   36.10%.	   But	   the	   percentages	   of	   acquirers	   displaying	   statistically	   significant	   FE	   are	   low.	   For	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balanced	  samples	  of	  5	  acquisitions	  per	  acquirer,	  we	  find	  that	  6.23%,	  3.06%,	  and	  0.65%	  of	  acquirer	  FE	  
are	   significant	   at	   10%,	   5%,	   and	   1%	   confidence	   levels,	   respectively.	   These	   results	   are	   robust	   to	  
endogenous	   attrition	   due	   to	   past	   performance	   and	   controls	   for	   the	   varying	   time	   periods	   between	  
successive	   transactions.	   Thus,	   we	   assert	   that	   the	   claims	   presenting	   acquirer	   skills	   as	   a	   first-­‐order	  
factor	  to	  explain	  the	  cross-­‐section	  of	  acquirer	  CAR	  are	  overstated.	  	  
Our	   results	   accordingly	   contribute	   to	  M&A	   literature.	   They	   put	   into	   question	   Golubov	   et	   al.’s	  
(2015,	   p.	   315)	   general	   conclusions	   that	   “acquirer	   returns	   are,	   indeed,	   best	   explained	   by	   an	  
unobserved,	   time-­‐invariant,	   firm-­‐specific	   factor.”	   Their	   conclusions	   rely	   on	   the	   B&S	   setup	   and	   the	  
persistence	  of	  acquirer	  performance	  throughout	  acquisition	  programs.	  We	  show	  that	  FE	  Fisher	  tests	  
for	  data	  panels	   that	  display	  strong	  right-­‐skewed	  attrition	  are	  over-­‐sized	  and	  can	   lead	   to	   inaccurate	  
inferences1.	  Golubov	  et	   al.	   (2015)	  also	   report	   the	  presence	  of	  persistence	   in	  acquirer	  performance	  
through	  acquisition	  programs—notable,	  but	  not	  enough	  to	  validate	  the	  presence	  of	  skills.	  As	  Aktas	  et	  
al.	  (2009)	  show,	  acquirer	  performance	  persistence	  also	  might	  be	  consistent	  with	  learning.	  	  
Our	   results	   instead	   support	   Fee	   et	   al.’s	   (2013)	   challenges	   to	   B&S’s	   results,	   in	  which	   they	   used	  
evidence	   from	  exogenous	  CEO	  departures	   to	   test	  whether	   these	   shocks	  affect	   firm	  behavior.	   They	  
find	  no	   such	   effect,	   in	   contrast	  with	   predictions	   based	  on	   the	  management	   style	   hypothesis.	   They	  
also	  assess	  the	  power	  of	  the	  B&S	  approach	  for	  uncovering	  management	  style,	  scrambling	  their	  data	  
in	  such	  a	  way	  that,	  by	  construction,	  a	  management	  style	  effect	  cannot	  exit.	  To	  test	  for	  the	  presence	  
of	  a	  management	  style	  on	  this	  simulated	  data	  set,	  they	  use	  the	  B&S	  setup.	  The	  FE	  Fisher	  test	  in	  that	  
case	  led	  to	  a	  spurious	  conclusion	  about	  the	  presence	  of	  a	  management	  style	  effect.	  We	  extend	  this	  
analysis	  to	  of	  the	  case	  of	  data	  panel	  attrition	  patterns	  that	  characterize	  M&A	  samples.	  We	  also	  offer	  
the	  RBSD	  approach	  as	  an	  improved	  method	  to	  detect	  acquirer	  skills.	  
	  
1. Data	  	  
	  
1.1.	  M&A	  Sample	  
We	  collect	  M&A	  transactions	  from	  the	  SDC	  database	  over	  the	  1990–2011	  period,	  with	  the	  same	  
selection	  criteria	  used	  by	  Golubov	  et	  al.	  (2015):	  	  
-­‐ Domestic	  transactions	  (U.S.	  acquirers	  and	  U.S.	  targets);	  	  
-­‐ Completed	  control	  transactions	  (acquirer	  holds	  less	  than	  50%	  of	  the	  target	  shares	  before	  the	  
announcement	  and	  ends	  up	  with	  100%	  of	  the	  target	  shares);	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  Consistent	  with	  our	  simulation	  results,	  Golubov	  et	  al.	  (2015)	  report	  that	  for	  a	  subsample	  of	  
acquirers	  that	  completed	  at	  least	  two	  deals	  during	  1990–2011,	  the	  Fisher	  joint	  test	  of	  FE	  significance	  
drops	  sharply	  (in	  Table	  2,	  from	  1.692	  in	  Panel	  A	  to	  1.287	  and	  1.261	  in	  Panels	  B	  and	  C).	  Table	  2	  also	  
reports	  that	  the	  adjusted	  R-­‐square	  value	  drops	  from	  23.1%	  in	  the	  full	  sample	  to	  12%	  and	  6.8%,	  
respectively,	  for	  subsamples	  of	  serial	  acquirers.	  These	  results	  are	  more	  consistent	  with	  ours.	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-­‐ Public	  acquirers	  and	  targets	  of	  all	  statuses	  (private,	  public,	  subsidiaries);	  
-­‐ Deal	  value	  of	  at	  least	  US$	  1	  million;	  
-­‐ Relative	  transaction	  size	  (ratio	  of	  the	  deal	  value	  to	  the	  acquirer	  market	  value)	  of	  at	  least	  1%;	  
-­‐ Financial	  industries	  (SIC	  codes	  6000–6999)	  excluded;	  and	  	  
-­‐ Necessary	   information	   available	   in	   the	   CRSP	   and	   COMPUSTAT	   databases	   to	   compute	   the	  
acquirer	  CAR	  and	  the	  set	  of	  control	  variables.	  
Applying	  these	  criteria,	  we	  collected	  12,707	  deals.	  Golubov	  et	  al.	   (2015)	  obtain	  12,491	  transactions	  
over	  the	  same	  period.	  Table	  1,	  Panel	  A,	  reports	  the	  number	  of	  deals	  by	  year;	  Panel	  B	  reports	  them	  by	  
deal	  order	  number	  (DON),	  which	  is	  the	  deal	  number	  in	  the	  sequence	  of	  transactions	  completed	  by	  a	  
given	  acquirer.	   In	  Table	  1,	  Panel	  A,	  the	  M&A	  waves	  at	  the	  end	  of	  the	  1990s	  and	  the	  mid-­‐2000s	  are	  
apparent	   (see	   also	   Betton	   et	   al.,	   2008).	   Furthermore,	   Figure	   1,	   Panel	   B,	   displays	   the	   well-­‐known	  
stylized	  facts	  about	  the	  presence	  of	  repetitive	  acquirers,	  such	  that	  there	  are	  many	  one-­‐time	  acquirers	  
(41.25%	   of	   all	   acquirers	   in	   our	   sample,	   or	   1,859	   out	   of	   4,507),	   as	   well	   as	   some	   active	   repetitive	  
acquirers	  (781	  firms	  completed	  at	  least	  five	  deals,	  or	  17.33%	  of	  the	  sample).	  These	  statistics	  coincide	  
with	  previous	  reports	  (e.g.,	  Aktas	  et	  al.,	  2012).	  
	  
1.2.	  Dependent	  Variable	  	  
	   The	  acquirer	  CAR	  is	  the	  dependent	  variable.	  We	  calculate	  it	  over	  a	  three-­‐day	  event	  window	  
centered	  on	  the	  deal	  announcement,	  as	  reported	  in	  the	  SDC	  database.	  We	  obtain	  abnormal	  returns	  
using	  the	  market	  model.	  We	  choose	  an	  estimation	  window	  from	  day	  –300	  to	  day	  –91	  relative	  to	  the	  
announcement	  on	  day	  0.	  Table	  1	  displays	  the	  descriptive	  statistics	  of	  interest.	  The	  acquirer	  average	  
CAR	   is	   1.71%,	   a	   figure	   typical	   of	   large	  M&A	   samples	   that	   include	   public	   and	   private	   targets	   (e.g.,	  
Moeller	  et	  al.	  (2004)	  report	  1.10%	  in	  a	  sample	  of	  12,023	  transactions	  during	  1980–2001;	  Betton	  et	  al.	  
(2008)	  report	  0.73%	  for	  a	  sample	  of	  9,298	  transactions	  over	  1980–2005).	  As	  Table	  1,	  Panel	  A,	  shows,	  
M&A	   transactions	   were	   more	   profitable	   for	   acquirers	   during	   the	   early	   1980s	   (cf.	   1980).	   Panel	   B	  
reveals	   the	   clearly	   declining	   trend	   of	   acquirer	   CAR	   as	   a	   function	   of	   the	  DON,	  which	   some	   authors	  
interpret	  as	  a	  signal	  of	  hubris	  or	  overconfidence	   (Billet	  and	  Qian,	  2008),	   though	  Aktas	  et	  al.	   (2009)	  
argue	  that	  declining	  CAR	  through	  acquisition	  programs	  is	  not	  such	  an	  unambiguous	  indicator.	  
	  
1.3.	  Control	  Variables	  	  
	   We	   collect	   a	   set	   of	   control	   variables	   widely	   used	   in	  M&A	   literature	   (Moeller	   et	   al.,	   2004;	  
Golubov	  et	  al.,	  2015):	  
-­‐ Bidder	   size:	   the	   bidder’s	  market	   value	   at	   the	   end	   of	   the	   fiscal	   year	   before	   the	   acquisition	  
announcement	  in	  millions	  of	  U.S.	  dollars;	  
-­‐ Cash:	  a	  dummy	  variable	  equal	  to	  1	  if	  the	  transaction	  is	  fully	  paid	  in	  cash;	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-­‐ Stock:	  a	  dummy	  variable	  equal	  to	  1	  if	  the	  transaction	  is	  fully	  paid	  in	  stock;	  
-­‐ Private:	  a	  dummy	  variable	  equal	  to	  1	  if	  the	  target	  is	  a	  private	  company;	  
-­‐ Public:	  a	  dummy	  variable	  equal	  to	  1	  if	  the	  target	  is	  a	  public	  company;	  
-­‐ Subsidiary:	  a	  dummy	  variable	  equal	  to	  1	  if	  the	  target	  is	  a	  subsidiary;	  
-­‐ Tobin’s	   Q:	   the	   acquirer	   market	   value	   of	   assets	   (defined	   as	   the	   book	   value	   of	   total	   assets	  
minus	  common	  equity	  plus	  the	  market	  value	  of	  equity)	  divided	  by	  the	  acquirer	  book	  value	  of	  
assets;	  
-­‐ Run-­‐up:	  the	  market-­‐adjusted	  buy	  and	  hold	  return	  of	  the	  acquirer’s	  stock	  price	  from	  day	  –210	  
to	  day	  –11	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  announcement	  date;	  
-­‐ FCF	   (free	   cash-­‐flow):	   the	   acquirer’s	   operating	   income	   before	   depreciation	   minus	   interest	  
expense	  and	   income	   taxes	  plus	   changes	   in	  deferred	   taxes	  and	   investment	   tax	   credit	  minus	  
dividends	  on	  both	  preferred	  and	  common	  share	  divided	  by	  the	  book	  value	  of	  total	  assets;	  
-­‐ Leverage:	   the	   acquirer’s	   long-­‐term	   debt	   divided	   by	   the	  market	   value	   of	   assets,	   defined	   as	  
above;	  
-­‐ Sigma:	  the	  standard	  deviation	  of	  the	  acquirer	  market-­‐adjusted	  daily	  returns	  from	  day	  –210	  to	  
day	  –11	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  announcement	  date;	  
-­‐ Relative	  size:	  the	  ratio	  of	  the	  deal	  value	  to	  the	  acquirer	  market	  value;	  
-­‐ Relatedness:	  a	  dummy	  variable	  equal	  to	  1	   if	   the	  bidder	  and	  the	  target	  operate	   in	  the	  same	  
industry	  at	  the	  two-­‐digit	  SIC	  code	  level;	  
-­‐ Tender	  offer:	  a	  dummy	  variable	  equal	  to	  1	  if	  the	  deal	  is	  classified	  as	  a	  tender	  offer	  in	  the	  SDC	  
database;	  and	  	  
-­‐ Hostile:	  a	  dummy	  equal	  to	  1	  if	  the	  transaction	  is	  classified	  as	  hostile	  in	  the	  SDC	  database.	  
The	  acquirer	  market	   value	   and	  acquirer	   financial	   statements	   items	  are	   collected	  at	   the	  end	  of	   the	  
fiscal	  year	  before	  the	  M&A	  announcement	  date.	  
	   Using	  the	  descriptive	  statistics	  by	  year	  and	  by	  DON	  in	  Table	  1,	  we	  can	  compare	  our	  data	  with	  
Moeller	  et	  al.’s	  (2004),	  though	  their	  sample	  covers	  a	  different	  period	  (1980–2001).2	  Our	  average	  deal	  
value	  is	  US$	  377	  million,	  versus	  US$	  257	  million	  in	  Moeller	  et	  al.	  (2004),	  which	  matches	  the	  secular	  
increase	   in	  deal	  values.	  A	  corresponding	   increase	  appears	   in	  the	  average	  acquirer’s	  market	  value—
US$	  2,777	  million	  versus	  US$	  1,708	  million.	  The	  percentage	  of	  fully	  cash	  paid	  transactions	  is	  27.11%	  
in	   our	   sample	   versus	   40.44%	   in	  Moeller	   et	   al.’s	   (2004),	   and	   the	   acquirer	   Tobin’s	   Q	   is	   2.19	   in	   our	  
sample	   versus	   1.89.	   According	   to	   these	   statistics,	   our	   M&A	   sample	   does	   not	   display	   unexpected	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2	  A	  comparison	  with	  Golubov	  et	  al.	  (2015),	  who	  analyze	  the	  same	  period,	  is	  not	  possible	  because	  
they	  do	  not	  report	  descriptive	  statistics.	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features.	   Finally,	   several	   of	   the	   control	   variables	  display	   a	   clear	   time	   trend,	   including	  Cash	  dummy	  
(strongly	  increasing),	  Public	  dummy	  (decreasing),	  and	  Relative	  size	  (strongly	  decreasing).	  
	   According	  to	  the	  statistics	  by	  DON	  in	  Table	  1,	  Panel	  B	  (as	  also	  reported	  by	  Aktas	  et	  al.,	  2012),	  
several	  variables	   increase	  with	   the	  DON,	   including	  deal	  values	   (suggesting	   that	  acquirers	   start	  with	  
small	   transactions),3	  acquirer	   market	   value	   (i.e.,	   repetitive	   acquirers	   are	   larger	   firms	   or	   else	   grow	  
through	  acquisition),	  Cash	  dummy,	   Leverage,	  and	  Tender	  offers.	   In	   contrast,	  Tobin’s	  Q,	  Sigma,	  and	  
Relative	  size	  decrease,	  consistent	  with	  the	  increase	  in	  acquirer	  size	  in	  the	  latter	  case.	  	  
	   Table	  2	  contains	  the	  results	  of	   the	  multivariate	  analyses	  of	  acquirer	  CAR.	  Column	  1	  reports	  
estimates	  obtained	  with	   the	  classical	  OLS	  estimator,	  and	   then	   in	  column	  2,	  we	  add	  year	  FE,	  and	   in	  
column	  3,	  we	  present	  results	  obtained	  with	  the	  acquirer	  FE	  estimator.	  The	  comparison	  of	  the	  column	  
2	   results	   with	   Golubov	   et	   al.’s	   (2015)	   table	   1,	   using	   the	   same	   estimator,	   reveals	   nearly	   the	   same	  
results	   (though	   the	   interactions	   of	  Public	   and	  Cash	   and	   of	  Private	   and	   Stock	   are	   significant	   in	   our	  
case).	  As	  we	  show	  in	  column	  3,	  the	  acquirer	  FE	  estimator	  is	  relevant	  for	  panel	  data,	  and	  bidder	  size	  
negatively	  affects	  acquirer	  CAR,	  as	  does	  Run-­‐up,	  Leverage,	  and	  the	  interaction	  between	  acquiring	  a	  
public	  target	  and	  paying	  in	  stock.	  Sigma	  (i.e.,	  acquirer	  stock	  return	  standard	  deviation),	  Relative	  size,	  
and	   the	   interaction	   between	   acquiring	   a	   private	   company	   and	   paying	   in	   stock	   all	   have	   positive	  
impacts	  on	  acquirer	  CAR.	  Comparisons	  of	   the	   results	   across	   columns	   show	   that	   the	   significance	  of	  
Bidder	  size,	  Run-­‐up,	  Sigma,	  the	  interaction	  of	  Public	  target	  and	  Stock	  acquisition,	  and	  the	  interaction	  
of	  Private	  and	  Stock	  acquisition	  are	  all	  robust	  to	  the	  chosen	  estimator.	  In	  addition,	  Leverage	  changes	  
sign	   (from	   positive	   to	   negative)	   when	   adopting	   the	   acquirer	   FE	   estimator.	   The	   positive	   relation	  
between	   acquirer	   CAR	   and	   acquirer	   leverage	   is	   a	   cross-­‐sectional	   phenomenon	   (more	   leveraged	  
acquirers	   complete	  more	  value-­‐creating	   transactions	  on	  average),	  not	  a	   time-­‐series	  one	   (increased	  
leverage	  for	  a	  given	  acquirer	  leads	  to	  a	  decrease	  in	  CAR	  on	  average).	  	  
	  
2. Econometric	  Estimators	  and	  Statistics	  of	  Interest	  
The	  B&S	  approach	  relies	  on	  a	  fixed	  effects	  (FE)	  panel	  data	  regression.	  The	  population	  regression	  
model	  takes	  the	  following	  form	  for	  the	  present	  case:	  
	   𝑦!,! = 𝛼 + 𝒙!,!𝜷 + 𝑣! + 𝜀!,!,	   	   	   	   	   (1)	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  




where	  𝑖	  is	   the	   acquirer	   index,	  𝑡	  is	   the	   transaction	   index,	  𝑦!,!	  is	   the	   variable	   of	   interest	   (eg.,	   a	   firm	  
performance	  measure	   such	  as	   the	  Return	  On	  Assets),	   	  𝒙!,!	  is	   a	   vector	  of	   explanatory	   variables,	  𝜷	  is	  
the	   corresponding	   vector	   of	   coefficients,	  𝑣! + 𝜀!,! 	  is	   the	   error	   term,	  𝑣! 	  is	   acquirer-­‐specific	   error	  
capturing	  time-­‐constant	  unobservable	  factors,	  and	  𝜀!,!	  is	  the	  “classic”	  error	  term	  (uncorrelated	  with	  𝒙!,! 	  and	  𝑣! ).	   B&S	   use	   the	   LSDV	   regression	   to	   estimate	   firm	   FEs,	   which	   essentially	   estimates	   the	  
following	  regression	  model:	  
	   𝑦!,! = 𝑐 + 𝛼! + 𝒙!,!𝜷 + 𝜀!,!,	   	   	   	   	   	   (2)	  
	  
where	  𝛼! 	  is	   a	   dummy	   variables	   equal	   to	   1	   for	   acquirer	   i.	   The	   OLS	   estimates	  𝛼! 	  are	   unbiased	  
estimators	  of	  𝑣!,4	  the	  firm	  FE	  of	  interest.5	  	  
Next,	  B&S	  study	  the	  behavior	  of	  R-­‐square	  and	  adjusted	  R-­‐square,	  two	  statistics	  classically	  used	  as	  
goodness	   of	   fit	   measures,	   and	   of	   the	   Fisher	   joint	   significance	   test	   of	   FE,	   computed	   using	   LSDV	  
estimates:	  	  
	   𝑅!!"#$ = 1 − !!"!"#$!"" 	  ,	   	   	   	   	   	   	   (3)	  𝐴𝑑𝑗  𝑅!!"#$ = 1 − !!!!!!!!×(1 − 𝑅!!"#$)	  ,	  and	   	   	   	   (4)	  𝐹 = 𝑹  𝜶!𝒓 ! 𝑹  𝚺𝜶𝑹! !! 𝑹  𝜶!𝒓! 	  ,	   	   	   	   	   	   (5)	  
	  
where	  𝑅!!"#$ 	  refers	  to	  the	  LSDV	  R-­‐square,	  𝐴𝑑𝑗  𝑅!!"#$ 	  is	  the	  adjusted	  LSDV	  R-­‐square,	  𝑆𝑆𝑅!"#$ 	  is	  the	  
sum	  of	  squared	  LSDV	  residuals,	  𝑇𝑇𝑆	  is	   the	  total	  sum	  of	  squares,	  𝑛	  is	   the	  number	  of	  observations	   in	  
the	   sample,	  𝑘	  is	   the	  number	  of	   estimated	   coefficients,	  𝐹	  is	   the	   FE	   Fisher	   Statistic,6	  (𝑹  𝜶 − 𝒓)	  is	   the	  
matrix	  of	  linear	  restrictions	  (all	  FE	  =	  0);	  𝑹	  is	  the	  matrix	  of	  linear	  restriction	  coefficients;	  𝜶	  is	  the	  vector	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4	  The	  𝛼! 	  OLS	  estimates	  are	  not	  consistent	  because,	  for	  a	  given	  𝑇	  (number	  of	  transactions),	  their	  
asymptotic	  variance	  does	  not	  converge	  to	  zero	  as	  𝑁	  (the	  number	  of	  acquirers)	  goes	  to	  infinity	  (see	  
Greene,	  2011).	  
5	  Other	  estimators	  are	  available	  to	  estimate	  the	  vector	  𝜷	  of	  coefficients.	  The	  pooled	  estimator	  runs	  a	  
classical	  regression,	  ignoring	  the	  presence	  of	  time-­‐constant	  unobservable	  factors;	  the	  within	  
estimator	  runs	  a	  regression	  on	  group-­‐demeaned	  observations;	  and	  the	  between	  estimator	  runs	  on	  
the	  variation	  of	  group	  means	  around	  the	  overall	  mean.	  None	  of	  these	  estimators	  provides	  estimates	  
of	  the	  𝛼! 	  of	  interest	  though.	  
6	  Even	  if	  the	  OLS	  𝛼! 	  estimates	  are	  not	  consistent,	  the	  FE	  Fisher	  is	  valid	  to	  test	  the	  null	  hypothesis	  of	  𝛼! 	  being	  jointly	  equal	  to	  zero	  (see	  Greene,	  2011).	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of	   estimated	  FE;	  𝒓	  is	   a	   vector	  of	   constants	   (0	   in	  our	   case);	  𝚺𝜶	  is	   the	  estimated	  variance–covariance	  
matrix	  of	  𝜶;	  and	  𝑞	  is	  the	  number	  of	  restrictions.	  
Even	   if	   asymptotic	   distributions	   of	   the	   R-­‐square	   and	   adjusted	   R-­‐square	   statistics	   exist,	   these	  
depend	  on	  unknown	  parameters	  (see	  Ohtani,	  2000).	  Moreover,	  without	  a	  clear	  null	  hypothesis,	  their	  
interpretation	   remains	   ambiguous.	   These	   are	   most	   probability	   the	   reasons	   explaining	   their	   use	  
restricted	  to	  goodness	  of	  fit	  measures.	  On	  the	  contrary,	  the	  FE	  Fisher	  statistic	   is	  classically	  used	  for	  
formal	   statistical	   inferences	   because	   it’s	   asymptotic	   distribution	   depends	   only	   on	   parameters	   that	  
can	  be	  estimated	  using	  their	  sample	  counterparts.	  It	  is	  also	  important	  to	  recognize	  that	  the	  FE	  Fisher	  
tests	   the	   null	   hypothesis	   that	   “all	   FEs	   jointly	   equal	   0,”	   which	   is	   rejected	   if	   even	   only	   one	   of	   the	  
constraint	  is	  rejected	  while	  all	  other	  ones	  are	  satisfied.	  Although	  it	  is	  informative	  about	  the	  presence	  
of	  at	  least	  one	  skilled	  acquirer	  in	  our	  case,	  the	  FE	  Fisher	  Statistic	  provides	  no	  information	  about	  the	  
frequency	  of	  the	  phenomenon	  (i.e.,	  number	  of	  skilled	  acquirers	  in	  the	  sample).	  Moreover,	  the	  Fisher	  
test	   is	   bilateral	   and	   reacts	   to	   the	  presence	  of	   both	  positively	   and	  negatively	   significant	   FE.	   It	   does	  
therefore	  not	  discriminate	  between	  positive	  (value-­‐creating)	  and	  negative	  (value-­‐destroying)	  skills.	  
	  
3. Simulation	  Procedures	  
	  
3.1.	  Attrition	  Pattern	  
	   At	   the	   heart	   of	   our	   study	   is	   the	   simulation	   of	   different	   attrition	   patterns,	   depicting	   the	  
percentage	  of	  acquirers	  that	  complete	  a	  given	  number	  of	  deals	  (we	  limit	  ourselves	  to	  a	  maximum	  of	  
10	   deals,	   because	   fewer	   than	   3.6%	   of	   the	   transactions	   have	   a	   DON	   above	   10	   during	   our	   sample	  
period7).	  We	  simulate	  both	  a	  rapid	  pace	  of	  attrition	  (right-­‐skewed	  attrition)	  and	  slow	  pace	  of	  attrition	  
(left-­‐skewed	  attrition)	  using	  Equation	  6:	  
	   %  𝑆𝑎𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒!" = 100  × !!  ×!"!!  ×!!!!! 	  ,	   	   	   	   (6)	  
	  
where	  %  𝑆𝑎𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒!" 	  is	   the	   percentage	   of	   acquirers	   having	   completed	  𝑁𝐷 	  deals	   in	   the	   simulated	  
sample	   and	  𝑁	  is	   the	  maximum	  number	   of	   deals	   completed	  by	   any	   given	   acquirer	   in	   the	   simulated	  
sample	   (10	   in	   the	  present	  case).	  We	  choose	  𝛼	  equal	   to	  –1,	  –0.5,	  and	  –0.1	   for	   rapid	  attrition	   (right-­‐
skewed	  attrition)	  and	  to	  0.1,	  0.5,	  and	  1	  for	  slow	  attrition	  (left-­‐skewed	  attrition).	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7	  Generating	  simulated	  samples	  containing	  an	  important	  proportion	  of	  highly	  repetitive	  acquirers	  
leads	  indeed	  to	  incorporate	  many	  times	  the	  same	  acquirers	  in	  each	  simulated	  samples.	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We	   also	   add	   the	   constant	   repartition	   of	   transactions	   by	   numbers	   of	   deals	   (10%	   of	   the	  
sample).	   Figure	  1,	   Panel	  A,	   presents	   the	  different	   attrition	  patterns	  obtained	  using	   this	  procedure.	  
From	   left	   to	   right,	   we	   shift	   from	   a	   drastically	   right-­‐skewed	   attrition	   pattern	   to	   a	   drastically	   left-­‐
skewed	   attrition	  pattern.	   The	   first	   three	   columns	   correspond	   to	  𝛼	  equal	   to	   –1,	   –0.5,	   and	   –0.1;	   the	  
middle	   column	   indicates	   the	   constant	   repartition;	   and	   the	   last	   three	   columns	   reflect	   the	  
corresponding	  left-­‐skewed	  attrition	  patterns.	  Panel	  A	  also	  displays	  the	  corresponding	  percentages	  of	  
transactions	   included	   in	   the	   sample	   for	   each	   number	   of	   deals.	   Figure	   1,	   Panel	   B,	   displays	   the	  
percentage	  of	  transactions	  by	  number	  of	  deals	  in	  our	  actual	  M&A	  sample.	  A	  comparison	  of	  Panels	  A	  
and	  B	  reveals	  that	  the	  attrition	  pattern	  featuring	  our	  M&A	  sample	  closely	  corresponds	  to	  the	  right-­‐
skewed	  attrition	  pattern	  in	  which	  𝛼	  equals	  –0.5.	  
	  
3.2.	  Brown	  and	  Warner	  (B&W,	  1985)	  Simulations	  
	   We	  study	  the	  interactions	  between	  the	  behavior	  of	  the	  R-­‐square,	  the	  adjusted	  R-­‐square,	  the	  
FE	  Fisher	  Statistic,	  and	  attrition	  patterns	  by	  implementing	  a	  B&W-­‐style	  approach.	  We	  refer	  to	  B&W	  
because	   the	   simulation	   environment	   relies	   on	   a	   real	   data	   set—namely,	   our	   M&A	   sample—not	   a	  
simulated	   one	   (such	   that	   we	   would	   have	   implemented	   a	   Monte	   Carlo	   approach).	   The	   simulation	  
procedure	  is	  as	  follows:	  
(i) Begin	  with	  the	  actual	  M&A	  sample	  (Section	  1).	  We	  limit	  the	  sample	  to	  transactions	  with	  
DON	  less	  than	  or	  equal	  to	  10	  to	  match	  the	  simulated	  attrition	  patterns,	  leaving	  a	  sample	  
of	  12,253	  transactions.	  	  
(ii) Randomly	  assign	  M&A	  transactions	  to	  acquirers	  by	  shuffling	  acquirer	  PERMNOs	  (i.e.,	  the	  
CRSP	   database	   permanent	   number,	   which	   is	   unique	   to	   each	   firm).	  We	   thus	   create	   an	  
M&A	  sample	  under	  a	  null	  hypothesis	  of	  no	  skills	   (we	  break	  any	  systematic	   relationship	  
between	  a	  given	  acquirer	  and	  given	  M&A	  transactions).	  
(iii) Model	   skills	   as	   a	   random	   drawing	   in	   a	   Gaussian	   distribution	   of	   abnormal	   returns	  
(denoted	  𝑁(0,𝜎!")).	  
(iv) Select	  one	  attrition	  pattern	  and	  randomly	  draw	  1,000	  sub-­‐samples	  of	  500	  deals	  so	  that	  
the	  attrition	  pattern	  is	  respected.8	  
(v) For	  each	  subsample:	  
a. For	  each	  acquirer	  𝑖	  in	  the	  subsample:	  
1. Draw	  a	  skill	  𝐴𝑅!,!" 	  in	  𝑁(0,𝜎!");	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8	  In	  robustness	  checks,	  we	  replicate	  this	  exercise	  with	  a	  constant	  number	  of	  acquirers	  and	  a	  constant	  
number	  of	  degrees	  of	  freedom	  (see	  Appendices	  1	  and	  2).	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2. Add	  𝐴𝑅!,!" 	  to	  the	  acquirer	  CAR	  of	  all	  transactions	  randomly	  attributed	  to	  the	  
acquirer	  in	  step	  (ii).	  
b. Estimate	   the	  same	  acquirer	  CAR	  regression	  as	   reported	   in	  Table	  2,	  column	  3,	  using	  
the	  LSDV	  FE	  estimator;	  
c. Collect	   the	   R-­‐square,	   adjusted	   R-­‐square,	   and	   FE	   Fisher	   Statistic	   obtained	   in	   the	  
previous	  step.	  
(vi) Compute	   the	   average	   R-­‐square,	   adjusted	   R-­‐square,	   and	   FE	   Fisher	   Statistic	   values	  
obtained	  over	  the	  1,000	  subsamples.	  
We	   execute	   this	   procedure	   for	   the	   combination	   of	   seven	   attrition	   patterns	   and	   for	   values	   of	  𝜎!" 	  
ranging	  from	  0%	  to	  5%	  in	  steps	  of	  1	  pp.	  The	  resulting	  42	  combinations	  allow	  us	  to	  analyze	  in	  depth	  
the	   interactions	   among	   attrition	   patterns	   in	  M&A	   samples,	   acquirer	   skills,	   and	   summary	   statistics	  
obtained	  using	  the	  LSDV	  FE	  estimator.	  The	  selected	  values	  of	  𝜎!" 	  are	  such	  that	  the	  no	  simulated	  skills	  
case	   is	   taken	   into	   account	   𝜎!" = 0 ,	  and	   simulated	   skills	   are	   on	   an	   order	   of	   magnitude	   of	   the	  
average	  acquirer	  CAR	  reported	  in	  prior	   literature.	  The	  higher	  𝜎!",	  the	  greater	  the	  probability	  that	  a	  
given	  acquirer	  will	  be	  imputed	  a	  high	  𝐴𝑅!,!" 	  (in	  absolute	  value)	  for	  each	  of	  its	  acquisitions,	  such	  that	  
more	  skilled	  acquirers	  will	  be	  present	  in	  the	  generated	  sample.	  
	  
4. Sample	  Attrition,	  LSDV	  R-­‐square,	  Adjusted	  R-­‐square,	  and	  FE	  Fisher	  Test	  
Table	   3	   and	   Figure	   2	   summarize	   our	   B&W	   simulation	   results.	   Table	   3	   comprises	   three	   panels,	  
focused	  on	  the	  behavior	  of	   the	  R-­‐square	   (Panel	  A),	   the	  adjusted	  R-­‐square	   (Panel	  B),	  and	  the	  Fisher	  
joint	  significance	  test	  of	  acquirer	  FE	  (Panel	  C).	  In	  each	  panel,	  the	  first	  column	  reports	  the	  level	  of	  𝜎!" 	  
used	   to	   simulate	   acquirer	   skills.	   The	   first	   two	   rows	   refer	   to	   the	   case	   of	   no	   acquirer	   skills,	   and	   the	  
difference	   between	   the	   two	   rows	   reflects	   the	   econometric	   estimator	   used	   (except	   in	   Panel	   C,	  
because	  we	  cannot	  compute	  a	  Fisher	  FE	  test	  with	  the	  OLS	  estimator).	  The	  second	  column	  specifies	  
the	  econometric	   estimator:	  OLS	  pooled	   regression	  or	   the	   LSDV	   regression	  model	   (see	  Equation	  2).	  
Therefore,	  row	  1	  is	  the	  benchmark	  case,	  row	  2	  highlights	  the	  consequences	  of	  switching	  from	  OLS	  to	  
LSDV	  in	  the	  case	  of	  no	  acquirer	  skills,	  and	  rows	  3–7	  explore	  the	  consequences	  of	  an	  increase	  in	  𝜎!" 	  
used	  to	  simulate	  acquirer	  skills.	  Columns	  3–9	  correspond	  to	  the	  seven	  attrition	  patterns	  introduced	  
in	  Section	  2	  and	  presented	  in	  Figure	  1,	  from	  right-­‐	  to	  left-­‐skewed	  attrition	  patterns.	  Figure	  2	  displays	  
the	  evolution	  of	   the	  three	  statistics	  of	   interest	   (R-­‐square,	  adjusted	  R-­‐square,	  and	  Fisher	   test)	  along	  
the	  seven	  attrition	  patterns	  (reproduced	  in	  the	  overlay),	  in	  the	  case	  of	  no	  acquirer	  skills	  (Panel	  A)	  and	  
when	  𝜎!" 	  equals	  5%	  (Panel	  B).	  	  
	   We	  comment	  first	  on	  the	  R-­‐square	  results	  (Table	  3,	  Panel	  A).	  In	  the	  case	  of	  no	  acquirer	  skills	  
(rows	   1	   and	   2),	   switching	   from	   OLS	   to	   LSDV	   dramatically	   increases	   the	   R-­‐square	   in	   the	   case	   of	  
attrition	   pattern	   1	   (most	   right-­‐skewed	   attrition).	   The	   R-­‐square	   goes	   from	   14.66%	   to	   74.44%,	   a	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fivefold	   increase.	   In	   the	   case	  of	   attrition	  pattern	  7	   (most	   left-­‐skewed	  attrition),	   the	   increase	   is	   still	  
impressive	   (from	   14.77%	   to	   24.21%)	   but	   significantly	   lower.	   These	   results	   exactly	   match	   our	  
expectations,	   because	   acquirer	   FE	   capture	   all	   acquirer	   cross-­‐sectional	   variation	   for	   one-­‐time	  
acquirers.	  Thus,	  	  
-­‐ in	   the	   case	   of	   a	   right-­‐skewed	   attrition	   pattern,	   the	   M&A	   sample	   is	   characterized	   by	   the	  
presence	   of	   many	   one-­‐time	   acquirers,	   for	   which	   FE	   captures	   100%	   of	   the	   cross-­‐sectional	  
variation	  of	   acquirer	   CAR	   (one	   constant	   for	   each	  one-­‐time	   acquirer).	   An	   increase	   in	   the	  R-­‐
square	  from	  the	  OLS	  to	  the	  LSDV	  estimation	  thus	  is	  no	  evidence	  of	  the	  presence	  of	  acquirer	  
skills;	  
-­‐ in	  the	  case	  of	  a	  left-­‐skewed	  attrition	  pattern,	  the	  M&A	  sample	  incorporates	  many	  repetitive	  
acquirers	   (63.21%	  of	  acquirers	  are	  ten-­‐time	  acquirers).	  For	   these	  acquirers,	   the	  acquirer	  FE	  
does	   not	   capture	   the	   time	   variation	   of	   acquirer	   CAR.	   The	   more	   they	   are	   present	   in	   the	  
sample,	  the	  lower	  is	  the	  increase	  in	  the	  explained	  variance	  due	  the	  presence	  of	  acquirer	  FE.	  
These	  results	  highlight	  an	   important	  phenomenon:	  attrition	  patterns	  drastically	  affect	   the	  behavior	  
of	   the	  R-­‐square,	   independent	  of	   the	  presence	  of	  acquirer	   skills,	  when	  switching	   from	  OLS	   to	  LSDV.	  
This	  R-­‐square	  behavior	  is	  clearly	  apparent	  in	  Figure	  2,	  Panel	  A.	  
	   The	  second	  striking	  pattern	  of	  behavior	  for	  the	  R-­‐square	  is	  that,	  using	  the	  LSDV	  estimator,	  it	  
is	   almost	   insensitive	   to	   simulated	   acquirer	   skills	   for	   right-­‐skewed	   attrition	   patterns	   (it	   oscillates	  
around	  75%).	  Only	  for	  the	  left-­‐skewed	  attrition	  pattern	  (many	  repetitive	  acquirers)	  does	  the	  R-­‐square	  
become	  more	   sensitive	   to	   simulated	   skills,	   ranging	   from	   25%	   for	   low	   levels	   of	  𝜎!" 	  to	   37%	   for	   the	  
highest	  level.	  This	  result	  again	  highlights	  that	  the	  LSDV	  R-­‐square	  is	  silent	  about	  the	  presence	  acquirer	  
skills	  in	  a	  situation	  with	  a	  right-­‐skewed	  attrition	  pattern.	  	  
Regarding	  the	  adjusted	  R-­‐square,	  Table	  3,	  Panel	  B,	  reports	  fundamentally	  different	  results.	  That	  
is,	   in	  the	  case	  of	  no	  acquirer	  skills,	  when	  switching	  from	  OLS	  to	  LSDV,	  the	  adjusted	  R-­‐square	  moves	  
from	  7.83	  %	   to	  9.08%	   	   for	   attrition	  pattern	  1.	   This	   result	   is	   to	  be	  expected;	   the	  adjusted	  R-­‐square	  
explicitly	  accounts	  for	  the	  number	  of	  estimated	  parameters	  (see	  Equation	  4).	  But	   is	  the	  acquirer	  R-­‐
square	  better	  able	  to	  detect	  the	  presence	  of	  acquirer	  skills?	  Focusing	  first	  on	  the	  most	  right-­‐skewed	  
attrition	  pattern,	  we	  observe	  that	  the	  average	  adjusted	  R-­‐square	  jumps	  from	  9.08%	  for	  no	  simulated	  
acquirer	   skills	   to	   26.13%	   for	  𝜎!" 	  equal	   to	   5%.	   This	   clear	   increase	   reveals	   a	   true	   reactivity	   of	   the	  
adjusted	  R-­‐square	  to	  simulated	  acquirer	  skills.	  This	  behavior	  also	  is	  nearly	  constant	  across	  the	  seven	  
simulated	  attrition	  patterns.	  Figure	  2,	  Panels	  A	  and	  B,	  highlight	  this	  flat	  behavior	  of	  the	  adjusted	  R-­‐
square.	   Thus,	   the	  main	   shortcomings	   of	   the	   adjusted	  R-­‐square	   as	   an	   indicator	   of	   the	   presence	   of	  
acquirer	  skills	  stem	  from	  its	  primary	  function,	  as	  a	  measure	  of	  the	  goodness	  of	  fit	  more	  than	  a	  formal	  




The	  FE	  Fisher	   test	   is	  a	   formal	  statistical	   test	  with	  available	  asymptotic	  p-­‐values,	   so	   it	  offers	   the	  
most	  interesting	  test	  for	  the	  presence	  of	  acquirer	  skills.	  As	  highlighted	  in	  Section	  2,	  we	  face	  a	  caveat	  
for	  analyzing	  acquirer	  CAR:	  the	  underlying	  null	  hypothesis	  is	  that	  acquirer	  FE	  (acquirer-­‐specific	  CAR)	  
are	   jointly	  equals	   to	  0.	  The	  Fisher	   test	   is	   therefore	  designed	  to	  detect	   the	  presence	  of	  at	   least	  one	  
skilled	  acquirer	  in	  the	  M&A	  sample	  under	  scrutiny,	  but	  it	  offers	  no	  input	  about	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  skills	  
(value-­‐creating	   or	   value-­‐destroying)	   or	   their	   frequency.	   Table	   3,	   Panel	   C,	   summarizes	   the	   B&W	  
simulation,	   including	   the	   average	   values	   along	   the	   various	   attrition	   patterns	   and	  𝜎!" 	  values.	  With	  
these	   average	   percentages,	   we	   study	   the	   FE	   test	   size	   when	   we	   simulate	   no	   acquirer	   skills	   (i.e.,	  
frequency	   of	   rejection	   of	   the	   null	   hypothesis	   of	   no	   acquirer	   skills	   when	   there	   are	   none,	   or	   type	   I	  
error),	  as	  well	  as	  the	  power	  of	  the	  FE	  test	  (frequency	  of	  rejection	  of	  the	  null	  hypothesis	  when	  there	  
are	  acquirer	  skills,	  or	  1-­‐	  type	  II	  errors).	  	  
The	  analysis	  of	  average	  FE	  Fisher	  Statistic	  values	   reveals	  promising	   features:	  across	  all	  attrition	  
patterns,	   it	   is	   increasing	   in	  𝜎!".	  That	   is,	   the	  more	   intensively	  we	  simulate	  acquirer	  skills,	   the	  higher	  
the	  FE	  test	  values	  are	  on	  average.	  This	  increase	  also	  is	  stronger	  for	  the	  left-­‐skewed	  attrition	  patterns,	  
which	   is	  a	  desirable	   result	  because	   this	   sample	  contains	  many	  more	   repetitive	  acquirers,	   such	   that	  
acquirer	  skills	  should	  be	  easier	  to	  detect.	  	  
Turning	  to	  the	  FE	  Fisher	  Statistic	  size,	  we	  observe	  that,	  at	  each	  confidence	  level	  for	  right-­‐skewed	  
attrition	   patterns,	   it	   is	   vastly	   over-­‐sized.	   For	   example,	   for	   attrition	   pattern	   2	   (most	   relevant	   with	  
respect	  to	  the	  real	  M&A	  sample,	  as	  highlighted	  in	  Figure	  1),	  the	  null	  hypothesis	  of	  no	  acquirer	  skills	  is	  
rejected	  15.5%	  of	  the	  time	  at	  a	  10%	  confidence	  level,	  11.30%	  at	  a	  5%	  confidence	  level,	  and	  6.00%	  at	  
a	  1%	  confidence	  level.	  This	  size	  issue	  depends	  on	  the	  attrition	  pattern,	  such	  that	  for	  the	  left-­‐skewed	  
pattern,	   it	  almost	  disappears	  (rejection	  rates	  fall	   to	  11.40%,	  6.50%,	  and	  1.40%	  at	  the	  10%,	  5%,	  and	  
1%	   confidence	   levels).	   As	   these	   results	   highlight,	   the	   LSDV	   FE	   test	   is	   well	   suited	   to	   test	   for	   the	  
presence	  of	  at	  least	  one	  significant	  FE	  when	  there	  are	  many	  repeated	  units	  of	  observation	  in	  a	  panel,	  
but	  it	  is	  not	  well	  suited	  when	  the	  sample	  incorporates	  many	  one-­‐time	  (or	  a	  limited	  number	  of	  time)	  
units.	  Yet	  M&A	  samples	  typically	  contain	  such	  units.	  The	  use	  of	  the	  B&S	  setup	  to	  detect	  acquirer	  skills	  
is	  therefore	  potentially	  highly	  misleading.	  
Finally,	   we	   observe	   that	   the	   power	   of	   the	   FE	   test	   increases	   with	  𝜎!" 	  and	   from	   right-­‐	   to	   left-­‐
skewed	  attrition	  patterns	  (as	  is	  clearly	  observable	  in	  Figure	  2,	  Panel	  B).	  
	  
5.	  Testing	  the	  Presence	  of	  Acquirer	  Skills	  	  
5.1.	  LSDV	  FE	  Test	  Size	  Issue	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Understanding	  the	  origin	  of	  the	  FE	  Fisher	  test	  size	  issue	  is	  a	  first	  step	  towards	  finding	  a	  solution.	  
Some	   intuition	   may	   be	   obtained	   starting	   from	   the	   well-­‐known	   expression	   that	   relates	   the	   Fisher	  
statistic	  to	  the	  R-­‐square:	  
	  
𝐹 𝐽,𝑁 − 𝐾 = !!!!∗!!!!!!!!! 	  	   	   	   	   	   	   (7)	  
	  
where	  𝑅!	  is	   the	   R-­‐square	   of	   the	   unconstrained	   regression,	  𝑅∗!	  is	   the	   R-­‐square	   of	   the	   constrained	  
regression,	  𝑞	  is	   the	  number	  of	   restrictions,	  𝑁	  is	   the	  number	  of	  observations	  and	  𝑘	  is	   the	  number	  of	  
estimated	  coefficients	  in	  the	  unrestricted	  model.	  
Let	  us	  take	  the	  simplest	  setup:	  a	  regression	  with	  only	  firm	  FE,	  two	  groups	  of	  firms	  (of	  size	  𝑁!	  and	  𝑁!	  respectively),	   the	   first	   group	   with	   firms	   observed	   only	   once	   and	   the	   second	   group	   with	   firms	  
observed	  𝑡	  times.	  The	  regression	  equation	  of	  the	  full	  model	  takes	  the	  following	  form:	  
	   𝑦!,! = 𝑐 + 𝛼!!𝐷!,! +⋯+ 𝛼!!! 𝐷!!,! + 𝛼!!  𝛾!𝐷!!!!,! +⋯+ 𝛼!!! 𝐷!!!!!,! + 𝜀!,!	  	   (8)	  
	  
where	  𝛼!!	  are	  the	  FE	  for	  the	  first	  group	  of	  firms	  and	  𝛼!!	  for	  the	  second.	  The	  null	  hypothesis	  is	  
therefore:	  
	   𝐻!:  𝛼!! = ⋯ = 𝛼!!! = 𝛼!! = ⋯ = 𝛼!!! = 0	  	   	   	   (9)	  
	  
	   In	  this	  simplified	  setup,	  𝑁 = 𝑁! + 𝑁!  ×𝑡 ,	  𝑘 = 𝑁! + 𝑁!,	  𝑞 = 𝑁! − 1 + 𝑁!,	  and,	  for	  the	  
constrained	  model,	  𝑅∗! = 0.	  The	  Fisher	  statistic	  becomes	  therefore:	  
	   𝐹 𝐽,𝑁 − 𝐾 = !!!!!! !!! !!(!!!!)!!!	  	   	   	   	   (10)	  
	  
If	  we	  take	  the	  limit	  when	  𝑁! → 𝑁	  (the	  sample	  is	  only	  composed	  of	  firms	  observed	  only	  one	  time),	  we	  
obtain:	  
	   lim!!→! !!!!!! !!! !!(!!!!)!!! = lim!!→! !!!!!!× lim!!→! !!! !!(!!!!)!!! =   ∞  ×0	  	   	   (11)	  
	  
Because	   the	   R-­‐square	   of	   a	   fixed-­‐effects	   regression	   containing	   only	   one	   	   observation	   per	   firm	  
(𝑁! = 𝑁)	  is	  100%	  and	  if	  𝑁! → 𝑁,	  𝑁! → 0.	  So,	  in	  the	  limit,	  the	  Fisher	  statistic	  is	  indeterminate.	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   M&A	  data	  panel	  samples	  are	  very	  specific	  in	  that	  they	  are	  characterized	  by	  the	  presence	  of	  
many	  one-­‐time	  acquirers	  (41.25%	  in	  our	  sample).	  The	  indeterminacy	  in	  the	  limiting	  case	  of	  a	  sample	  
composed	  only	  of	  one-­‐time	  acquirers	  suggests	   that	  this	  may	  be	  at	   the	  origin	  of	   the	  Fisher	  test	  size	  
issue.	   	  
	  
	  
5.2.	  Resampling	  Based	  Method	  for	  Detecting	  Acquirer	  Skills	  (RBSD)	  
If	  the	  presence	  of	  one-­‐time	  acquirers	  is	  at	  the	  origin	  of	  the	  Fisher	  test	  size	  issue,	  dropping	  them	  
from	   the	   sample	   is	   an	   easy	   cure.	   Starting	   from	   this	   insight,	   this	   section	   introduces	   a	   procedure	  
designed	   to	   be	   as	   powerful	   as	   possible	   to	   detect	   acquirer	   skills	   if	   they	   are	   present,	   referred	  
hereinafter	  to	  RBSD.	  Our	  goal	  is	  to	  make	  the	  number	  of	  acquisitions	  by	  acquirer	  constant.	  	  
A	   first	   and	   obvious	   solution	   is	   to	   limit	   the	   sample	   to	   acquirers	   that	   completed	   exactly	  𝑇	  
acquisitions.	  Then	  each	  acquirer	  FE	  can	  be	  estimated	  using	   the	   same	  number	  of	  observations,	  and	  
the	  FE	  Fisher	  test	  builds	  on	  Student	  laws	  with	  the	  same	  degrees	  of	  freedom.	  There	  is	  a	  serious	  caveat	  
to	  this	  approach	  though:	  the	  drastic	  reduction	  in	  sample	  size,	  affecting	  the	  power	  of	  the	  test.	  In	  our	  
sample,	  only	  256	  acquirers	  completed	  exactly	  5	  acquisitions,	  but	  781	  completed	  5	  or	  more.	  To	  fix	  this	  
issue,	  the	  RBSD	  resampling	  algorithm	  is	  as	  follows:	  
(i) Choose	  a	  given	  number	  of	  acquisitions	  𝑇	  by	  an	  acquirer;	  
(ii) Select	  all	  acquisitions	  by	  acquirers	  having	  completed	  at	  least	  T	  acquisitions.	  
(iii) Repeat	  1,000	  times:	  
a. for	   acquirers	   having	   completed	   strictly	   more	   than	   T	   acquisitions,	   random	   draw	  
exactly	  T	  acquisitions	  among	  their	  transactions;	  	  
b. using	  the	  sample	  of	  M&A	  acquisitions	  selected	  in	  the	  previous	  step,	  compute	  the	  FE	  
Fisher	  statistic	  and	  test	  whether	  it	  is	  significant	  against	  the	  Fisher	  distribution	  at	  10%,	  
5%,	  and	  1%	  confidence	  levels.	  
(iv) Report	  the	  average	  FE	  Fisher	  Statistic	  value	  across	  the	  1,000	  generated	  samples	  and	  the	  
percentage	  of	  statistically	  FE	  Fisher	  tests	  at	  10%,	  5%,	  and	  1%	  confidence	  levels.	  
We	  replicate	  the	  B&W	  study	  that	  applies	  the	  B&S	  approach	  from	  Section	  3	  to	  study	  the	  FE	  Fisher	  
test	  size	  and	  power	  computed	  using	  our	  proposed	  RBSD	  procedure.	  We	   implement	   it	   for	  T	   ranging	  
from	  2	   (minimum	  possible	  value	   to	  measure	  acquirer	  FE)	   to	  8	   (reflecting	  a	  marginal	  percentage	  of	  
acquirers,	  4.46%	  in	  our	  sample).	  To	  ensure	  the	  comparability	  of	  the	  results	  with	  the	  B&W	  simulation	  
study,	  we	  fixed	  the	  number	  of	  acquisitions	  to	  500	  by	  randomly	  drawing	   500/𝑇   acquirers	  from	  the	  
original	  sample	  in	  step	  (ii).	  We	  limit	  this	  investigation	  to	  the	  FE	  Fisher	  Statistic,	  because	  the	  R-­‐square	  
and	  adjusted	  R-­‐square	  goodness	  of	  fit	  statistics	  do	  not	  offer	  statistical	  tests.	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The	  results	  are	  in	  Table	  4,	  whose	  organization	  follows	  that	  of	  Table	  3,	  Panel	  C,	  except	  that	  here	  
we	  report	  average	  FE	  Fisher	  Statistic	  values	  and	  percentages	  of	  statistically	  significant	  tests	  at	  10%,	  
5%,	  and	  1%	  confidence	  levels	  for	  balanced	  panels	  of	  numbers	  of	  acquisitions	  ranging	  from	  2	  to	  8.	  In	  
particular,	   in	   Table	   4,	   Panel	   A,	   we	   observe	   that	   average	   FE	   test	   values	   are	   growing	   in	  𝜎!",	   which	  
drives	  simulated	  acquirer	  skills,	  and	  in	  the	  number	  of	  acquisitions.	  These	  are	  expected	  and	  desirable	  
features.	   The	   FE	   Fisher	   test	   also	   checks	   the	   null	   hypothesis	   that	   no	   acquirer	   FE	   is	   significantly	  
different	   from	   zero.	   We	   observe	   in	   Table	   4,	   Panel	   A,	   that	   the	   higher	   the	  𝜎!" ,	   the	   greater	   the	  
probability	  that	  at	  least	  one	  acquirer	  FE	  will	  be	  statistically	  significant.	  This	  has	  again	  to	  be	  expected:	  
the	  higher	  the	  number	  of	  acquisitions	  by	  the	  acquirer,	  the	  lower	  are	  the	  FE	  standard	  errors,9	  and	  the	  
higher	  is	  the	  FE	  Fisher	  Statistic	  value.	  	  
In	  the	  size	  analysis,	  a	  striking	  difference	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  B&S	  size	  (Table	  3,	  Panel	  C)	  emerges.	  
That	   is,	   the	   FE	   Fisher	   Statistic	   average	   rejection	  of	   the	  null	   hypothesis	  when	   the	  null	   hypothesis	   is	  
true	  (𝜎!" 	  =	  0%)	  is	  in	  the	  order	  of	  magnitude	  of	  the	  corresponding	  confidence	  levels,	  as	  verified	  for	  all	  
numbers	  of	  acquisitions.	  The	  FE	  Fisher	  test	  based	  on	  RBSD-­‐generated	  samples	  thus	  is	  correctly	  sized.	  
Finally,	  the	  improved	  size	  of	  the	  RBSD-­‐based	  FE	  Fisher	  test	  does	  not	  come	  at	  the	  cost	  of	  a	  loss	  of	  
power.	   Comparing	   average	   rejection	   percentages	   when	   the	   null	   hypothesis	   is	   false	   (𝜎!" > 0%)	  
between	   the	   B&S	   (Table	   3)	   and	   RBSD	   (Table	   4)	   approaches,	   and	   focusing	   on	   attrition	   pattern	   2	  
(relevant	   for	   the	   M&A	   sample,	   Figure	   1),	   we	   observe	   similar	   rejection	   rates.	   For	   example,	   with	  𝜎!" = 3%,	   the	   B&S	   average	   rejection	   rates	   are	   67.10%,	   56.70%,	   and	   37.40%	   at	   10%,	   5%,	   and	   1%	  
confidence	   levels,	   respectively.	  The	  corresponding	  RBSD-­‐based	   rejection	   rates	  are	  72.90%,	  61.30%,	  
and	   38.80%	   for	  M&A	   samples	   of	   four	   acquisitions.	   Increasing	   the	   number	   of	   acquisitions	   used	   to	  
detect	   skills,	   as	   we	   expected	   intuitively,	   improves	   the	   power	   of	   the	   test.	   Simulating	   skills	   with	  𝜎!" = 3%	  (5%	  of	  acquirers,	  on	  average,	  are	  imputed	  a	  positive	  skill	  𝐴𝑅	  of	  more	  than	  3%)	  and	  using	  
sequences	  of	  5	  acquisitions,	  the	  average	  rejection	  rates	  are	  79.90%,	  70.80%,	  and	  44.40%	  at	  10%,	  5%,	  
and	   1%	   confidence	   levels,	   respectively.	   Using	   8	   acquisition	   sequences,	   the	   average	   rejection	   rates	  
jump	  to	  89.90%,	  83.40%,	  and	  66.80%,	  respectively.	  Wooldridge	  (2002,	  p.	  274)	  emphasizes	  that	  “with	  
a	   large	  𝑇	  (number	   of	   periods),	   the	  𝑐(𝑖)	  (fixed	   effects)	   can	   be	   precise	   enough	   to	   learn	   something	  
about	   the	   distribution	   of	  𝑐(𝑖).	  With	   small	  𝑇,	   the	  𝑐(𝑖)	  can	   contain	   substantial	   noise.”	   This	   is	   exactly	  
what	  we	  observe	  in	  our	  simulations.	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9	  This	   increase	   with	   FE	   estimation	   precision	   as	   the	   number	   of	   acquisitions	   by	   acquirer	   grows	   also	   can	   be	  
observed	  when	  simulating	  attrition	  patterns.	  Figure	  3	  displays	  the	  average	  values	  of	  FE	  standards	  errors	  along	  
the	   seven	  attrition	  patterns	   simulated	   in	  Section	  3.	  They	  decrease	   steadily	   from	  right-­‐skewed	   to	   left-­‐skewed	  
attritions,	  as	  expected.	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5.3.	  Acquirer	  Skills	  in	  the	  M&A	  Market	  
Using	   this	   correctly	   sized,	   powerful	   procedure	   to	   detect	   acquirer	   skills,	   we	   revisit	   previous	  
evidence.	  Our	  analyses	  are	  based	  on	  the	  M&A	  sample	   in	  Section	  1.	   In	  Table	  5,	  we	  report	  the	  RBSD	  
results	  using	  our	  baseline	  specification	  (from	  Table	  2)	  in	  Panel	  A	  controlling	  for	  endogenous	  sample	  
attrition	  due	  to	  past	  poor	  performance	  in	  Panel	  B,	  and	  controlling	  for	  the	  time	  between	  deals	  (TBD)	  
in	   Panel	   C.	   In	   each	   panel,	  we	   report	   the	   number	   of	   observations	   and	   acquirers,	   then	   the	   average	  
Fisher	   value	   obtained	   on	   1,000	   generated	   samples,	   and	   finally	   the	   corresponding	   percentages	   of	  
Fisher	   value	   significant	   at	   10%,	   5%,	   and	   1%	   confidence	   levels.	   This	   first	   set	   of	   statistics	   is	  
complemented	  by	  the	  average	  percentages	  of	  significant	  FE	  (acquirer	  skills)	  at	  the	  same	  confidence	  
levels,	  with	  a	  partition	  between	  positive	  FE	  (value-­‐creating	  skills)	  and	  negative	  FE	  (value-­‐destroying	  
skills).	  We	  conduct	  these	  analyses	  for	  acquisition	  sequences	  from	  5	  to	  8	  transactions,	  consistent	  with	  
the	  RBSD	  power	  analysis	  results	  (Section	  5.2).	  Detecting	  acquirer	  skills,	  or	  the	  ability	  to	  create	  over-­‐
performance	  consistently,	  requires	  a	  minimum	  number	  of	  transactions	  by	  acquirer,	  especially	  for	  our	  
sample	  spread	  over	  22	  years.	  These	  analyses	  therefore	  are	  conservative,	  in	  that	  we	  focus	  on	  cases	  in	  
which	  acquisition	  sequences	  are	  long	  enough	  for	  a	  test	  of	  acquirer	  skills	  to	  have	  sufficient	  power	  to	  
reject	  the	  null	  hypothesis.	  
In	  Table	  5,	  Panel	  A,	  at	  a	  10%	  confidence	  level	  and	  with	  8	  transactions,	  the	  FE	  Fisher	  test	  rejects	  
the	  null	   hypothesis	  of	  no	  acquirer	   skills	   in	   94.20%	  of	   cases.	   This	   case	   is	   clearly	   the	  most	   favorable	  
setup	   to	   reject	   the	  absence	  of	  acquirer	   skills	   (minimum	   level	  of	  confidence	  and	   longest	  acquisition	  
sequence),	  but	  this	  first	  result	   leads	  us	  to	  conclude	  that	  acquirer	  skills	  exist.	  Still,	   the	  FE	  Fisher	  test	  
offers	   only	   low	   statistical	   significance.	   Still	   using	   8	   transactions	   sequences,	   the	   average	   FE	   Fisher	  
Statistic	  value	  is	  1.22;	  with	  a	  1%	  confidence	  level,	  the	  null	  hypothesis	  of	  no	  acquirer	  skills	  is	  rejected	  
only	  in	  41.70%	  of	  cases.	  The	  analysis	  of	  the	  percentages	  of	  significant	  FE	  complements	  this	  picture.	  
With	  8	  transaction	  sequences,	  at	  a	  10%	  confidence	  level,	  12.63%	  of	  the	  FE	  are	  statistically	  significant.	  
At	   a	   1%	   confidence	   level,	   this	   percentage	   drops	   to	   2.32%.	   Limiting	   the	   acquisition	   sequences	   to	   5	  
transactions,	  the	  percentages	  drop	  roughly	  by	  half.	  Therefore,	  the	  claims	  that	  acquirer	  skills	  provide	  
a	   first-­‐order	   factor	   explaining	   the	   cross-­‐section	   of	   acquirer	   CAR	   are	   overstated.	   Some	   acquirers	  
display	  persistent	  over-­‐	  or	  under-­‐performance,	  but	  they	  represent	  at	  best	  a	  limited	  subsample	  of	  the	  
repetitive	  acquirer	  population.	  	  
Figure	   4	   confirms	   this	   diagnostic.	   It	   presents	   the	   distribution	   of	   generated	   samples	   by	   the	  
percentage	  of	  statistically	  significant	  FE	  for	  5	  transaction	  acquisition	  sequences	  and	  a	  5%	  confidence	  
level.	  The	  distribution	  is	  spread	  over	  the	  1%–7%	  range;	  observing	  more	  than	  7%	  of	  significant	  FE	  in	  a	  
given	  generated	  sample	  is	  very	  rare,	  and	  in	  most	  cases,	  this	  percentage	  is	  below	  5%.	  Even	  if	  acquirer	  
skills	  are	  present,	  they	  pertain	  to	  a	  very	  limited	  number	  of	  acquirers.	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In	  Panel	  A,	  Table	  5	  also	  delivers	  the	  results	  for	  acquisition	  sequences	  of	  5	  and	  6	  transactions,	  in	  
which	  scenario	  a	  large	  majority	  of	  significant	  FE	  are	  negative.	  For	  example,	  at	  a	  5%	  confidence	  level	  
and	  with	  5	  acquisition	  sequences,	  we	  observe	  only	  0.95%	  significant	  and	  positive	  FE	  (value-­‐creating)	  
and	  2.11%	  significant	  and	  negative	  FE	   (value-­‐destroying).	  Apparently,	  acquirers	   implementing	  small	  
acquisition	  sequences	  display	  more	  negative	  skills	  than	  positive	  ones.	  This	  evidence	  reverts	  for	  longer	  
sequences	   though.	   With	   8	   acquisition	   sequences,	   still	   at	   a	   5%	   confidence	   level,	   7.26%	   of	   FE	   are	  
significant	  and	  positive,	  and	  only	  0.14%	  are	  negative	  and	  significant.	  Two	  mechanisms	  may	  explain	  
these	  observations:	  endogenous	  sample	  attrition	  and	  learning.	  We	  provide	  preliminary	  explorations	  
of	  their	  respective	  roles	  in	  Table	  5,	  Panels	  B	  and	  C.	  
If	   those	  engaged	   in	  poor	  acquisitions	  halt	   their	  activities	   (e.g.,	   if	   they	  become	   targets,	  Mitchell	  
and	  Lehn,	  1990;	  because	  their	  CEOs	  are	  fired,	  Lehn	  and	  Zhao,	  2006),	  an	  endogenous	  sample	  attrition	  
mechanism	  comes	  in	  to	  play.	  Acquirers	  observable	  in	  longer	  acquisitions	  sequences	  will	  no	  longer	  be	  
comparable	   to	   acquirers	   observable	   in	   shorter	   ones.	   We	   use	   previous	   acquisition	   CAR	   in	   the	  
acquisition	  sequence	   to	  measure	  acquisition	  decision	  quality	  and	   include	   this	  additional	  variable	   in	  
our	   baseline	   specification.	   Table	   5,	   Panel	   B,	   summarizes	   the	   results.	   We	   lose	   the	   case	   of	   5	  
transactions,	  because	  for	  comparability	  with	  Panel	  A,	  we	  impose	  a	  minimum	  of	  5	  transactions	  in	  any	  
given	  sequence.	  To	  obtain	  the	  CAR	  of	  the	  previous	  transaction	  for	  the	  first	  deal	  of	  the	  sequence	   in	  
addition	   to	   the	   5	   transactions	   in	   each	   sequence,	   we	   need	   therefore	   at	   least	   6	   transactions.	   The	  
results	   mimic	   those	   from	   Panel	   A,	   with	   a	   change	   in	   FE	   distribution	   asymmetry	   between	   6	   and	   7	  
transaction	  sequences.	  Endogenous	  sample	  attrition,	  if	  cured	  using	  previous	  transaction	  CAR,	  cannot	  
explain	  the	  FE	  distribution	  asymmetry	  along	  the	  number	  of	  acquisitions	  in	  transaction	  sequences.	  	  
A	  second	  possible	  explanation	  is	  learning.	  Aktas	  et	  al.	  (2012)	  develop	  a	  model	  of	  the	  optimal	  time	  
between	   successive	   transactions,	   to	   balance	   learning	   benefits	   against	   integration	   costs.	   Their	  
quadratic	  specification	  for	  learning	  benefits	  suggests	  that	  an	  overly	  short	  TBD	  does	  not	  allow	  learning	  
to	   take	   place,	   and	   an	   overly	   long	   TBD	   leads	   to	   losses	   of	   know-­‐how.	   Because	   our	   acquisition	  
sequences	  span	  22	  years,	  many	  years	  could	  separate	  successive	  observations.	  The	  fewer	  transactions	  
in	   a	   sequence,	   the	   greater	   the	   potential	   gap,	   and	   the	  more	   the	   acquirer	   risks	  memory	   loss.	  With	  
more	   transactions,	   the	   probability	   that	   learning	   benefits	  materialize	   increases.	   These	  mechanisms	  
may	   explain	   FE	   distribution	   behavior	   along	   the	   acquisition	   sequences	   in	   Table	   5,	   Panel	   A.	   Thus	   in	  
Table	  5,	  Panel	  C,	  we	  limit	  our	  sample	  to	  transactions	  spaced	  apart	  by	  no	  more	  than	  24	  months.	  In	  this	  
case,	   the	   FE	  distribution	  displays	  positive	   skewness	   along	  every	  number	  of	   acquisitions,	   consistent	  
with	   the	   notion	   that	   learning	   can	   help	   explain	   FE	   distribution	   asymmetry.	   However,	   the	   radical	  
change	  in	  the	  sample	  composition	  (i.e.,	  we	  lose	  almost	  one-­‐third	  of	  the	  observations	  by	  imposing	  the	  





Do	   acquirers	   display	   specific	   skills?	   Bertrand	   and	   Schoar	   (2003)	   introduce	   a	   test	   for	   the	  
presence	  of	  skills	  that	  relies	  on	  a	  panel	  data	  fixed	  effect	  estimator;	  they	  use	  it	  to	  estimate	  CEO	  skills.	  
The	   presence	   of	   repetitive	   acquirers	   in	   large	   M&A	   samples	   suggests	   the	   use	   of	   such	   a	   panel	  
estimator.	   But	  M&A	   samples	   are	   characterized	   by	   a	   specific	   attrition	   pattern,	   with	   the	   significant	  
presence	   of	   many	   one-­‐time	   acquirers.	   Therefore,	   we	   challenge	   the	   appropriateness	   of	   a	   B&S	  
approach	  for	  such	  data.	  
Our	  analysis	   rests	  on	  simulations	  designed	  specifically	   to	   test	  whether	   the	  attrition	  pattern	  
affects	   statistical	   inferences	   about	   acquirer	   skills	  when	  using	  panel	  data	   FE	  estimators.	  Our	   results	  
show	   without	   ambiguity	   that	   attrition	   strongly	   influences	   the	   R-­‐square	   statistic.	   The	   adjusted	   R-­‐
square	   and	   Fisher	   joint	   significance	   test	   of	   acquirer	   FE	   are	   more	   robust.	   But	   only	   the	   latter	   is	  
classically	  used	  as	  a	  formal	  statistical	  test,	  suited	  for	  testing	  (in	  statistical	  terms)	  for	  the	  presence	  of	  
acquirer	  skills,	  most	  probably	  because	  the	  R-­‐square	  and	  adjusted	  R-­‐square	  distributions	  depend	  on	  
unknown	   parameters.	   Our	   simulation	   results	   highlight	   a	   strong	   FE	   Fisher	   Statistic	   size	   issue	   for	  
samples	   that	  display	  attrition	  patterns	  comparable	   to	   the	  one	  observed	   in	   real	  M&A	  samples.	  This	  
over-­‐size	   issue	   in	   turn	   leads	   to	   rejecting	   far	   too	  often	   the	  absence	  of	   acquirer	   skills	   in	   their	   actual	  
absence.	  
We	   introduce	   a	   resampling	   procedure	   to	   test	   for	   the	   presence	   of	   acquirer	   skills,	   which	   is	  
robust	   to	   sample	   attrition.	   After	   studying	   its	   size	   and	   power,	   we	   apply	   it	   to	   a	   sample	   of	   12,707	  
acquisitions	  between	  1990	  and	  2011.	  Our	  results	  confirm	  the	  presence	  of	  skilled	  acquirers	  (acquirers	  
who	   display	   statistically	   significant	   over-­‐performance,	   persistent	   throughout	   the	   acquisition	  
sequences).	   But	   these	   skilled	   acquirers	   represent	   at	   most	   a	   marginal	   fraction	   of	   the	   repetitive	  
acquirer	   population.	   This	   raises	   a	   doubt	   that	   acquirer	   skills	   represent	   a	   primary	   explanation	   of	  
heterogeneity	  in	  acquirer	  CARs.	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Figure	  1:	  Panel	  Attrition	  Patterns	  
Figure	   1	   displays	   a	   graphical	   representation	   of	   the	   simulated	   (Panel	   A)	   and	   actual	   (Panel	   B)	   panel	   attrition	  
patterns.	   Simulated	   attrition	   patterns	   obey	   exponential	   laws,	   according	   to	   Equation	   1.	   The	   actual	   attrition	  
pattern	  corresponds	  to	  the	  numbers	  reported	  in	  Table	  1,	  Panel	  B.	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Figure	  2:	  Brown	  and	  Warner	  (B&W)	  Simulations	  
Figure	  2	  provides	  a	  graphical	  representation	  of	  the	  Brown	  and	  Warner	  (1985)	  simulation	  results	  in	  the	  case	  of	  
no	  acquirer	  skills	  (Panel	  A)	  and	  acquirer	  skills	  (Panel	  B,	  5%	  abnormal	  return	  standard	  deviation).	  The	  simulation	  
procedure	   is	  described	  in	  Section	  2.	  The	  M&A	  sample	   is	   introduced	  in	  Section	  1.	  The	  seven	  attrition	  patterns	  
correspond	  to	  the	  attrition	  patterns	  in	  Figure	  1,	  Panel	  A.	  The	  three	  statistics	  of	  interest	  are	  the	  R-­‐square	  (R2	  FE),	  
the	  adjusted	  R-­‐square	  (adj.	  R2	  FE),	  and	  the	  Fisher	  joint	  significance	  test	  of	  acquirer	  FE	  (F_stat	  FE).	  The	  R-­‐square	  
and	   adjusted	   R-­‐square	   are	   reported	   along	   the	   left	   vertical	   axis;	   the	   Fisher	   test	   values	   appear	   on	   the	   right	  
vertical	  axis.	  





Panel	  B:	  Acquirer	  Skills	  (𝝈𝑺𝑲 = 𝟓%)	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Figure	  3:	  Fixed	  Effect	  Standard	  Errors	  by	  Attrition	  Pattern	  	  
Figure	  3	  shows	  average	  values	  of	  FE	  standard	  errors	  for	  each	  of	  the	  seven	  attrition	  patterns	  introduced	  in	  
Figure	  1.	  These	  average	  values	  result	  from	  more	  than	  1,000	  randomly	  selected	  samples	  of	  500	  deals	  (constant	  
number	  of	  transactions	  for	  each	  attrition	  pattern).	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Figure	  4:	  Distribution	  of	  Statistically	  Significant	  Fixed	  Effects	  
Figure	  4	  reports	  histograms	  of	   the	  percentage	  of	  statistically	  significant	  FE.	  These	  percentages	  are	  computed	  
over	   1,000	   samples,	   generated	   using	   the	   resampling	   based	   method	   of	   detecting	   acquirer	   skills	   (RBSD),	   as	  
described	  in	  Section	  5.1.	  Samples	  are	  drawn	  from	  the	  M&A	  sample	  introduced	  in	  Section	  1.	  The	  results	  reflect	  









	   	  
	  
	  
Table	  1:	  Sample	  and	  Variable	  Descriptive	  Statistics	  
Table	  1	  reports	  the	  descriptive	  statistics	  for	  the	  M&A	  sample	  in	  our	  study.	  We	  collected	  M&A	  transactions	  from	  the	  Thomson	  SDC	  database	  for	  the	  1990–2011	  period,	  using	  
the	  same	  criteria	  as	  Golubov	  et	  al.	  (2015):	  transactions	  between	  U.S.	  acquirers	  and	  U.S.	  targets,	  completed	  control	  transactions	  (acquirer	  holds	  less	  than	  50%	  of	  the	  target	  
shares	  before	  the	  announcement	  and	  100%	  of	  the	  target	  shares	  after),	  public	  acquirers	  and	  targets	  of	  all	  statuses	  (private,	  public,	  subsidiaries),	  deal	  value	  at	  least	  equal	  to	  
US$1	  million,	  relative	  transaction	  size	  (deal	  value	  divided	  by	  the	  acquirer	  market	  value)	  at	  least	  equal	  to	  1%,	  no	  financial	  industries	  (SIC	  codes	  6000–6999),	  and	  information	  
necessary	  to	  compute	  the	  acquirer	  CAR	  and	  the	  set	  of	  control	  variables	  available	  in	  the	  CRSP	  and	  COMPUSTAT	  databases.	  Panel	  A	  displays	  statistics	  by	  year,	  and	  Panel	  B	  
provides	   the	  corresponding	   figures	  by	   the	  deal	  number	   in	   the	  sequence	  of	   transactions	  completed	  by	  a	  given	  acquirer	   (DON).	   In	  both	  panels,	   the	  columns	   reflect	   the	  #	  
Deals,	  or	  number	  of	  deals;	  Avg	  Deal	  Value,	  or	  average	  deal	  value	   in	  millions	  of	  U.S.	  dollars;	  Med	  Deal	  Value,	  the	  corresponding	  median;	  Avg	  Market	  Value,	  which	   is	  the	  
average	  market	  value	  of	  the	  acquirer	  at	  the	  end	  of	  the	  fiscal	  year	  before	  the	  acquisition	  announcement	  in	  millions	  of	  U.S.	  dollars;	  Cash,	  a	  dummy	  variable	  equal	  to	  1	  for	  
transactions	  fully	  paid	  in	  cash;	  Stock,	  a	  dummy	  variable	  equal	  to	  1	  for	  transactions	  fully	  paid	  in	  stock;	  Private,	  a	  dummy	  variable	  equal	  to	  1	  if	  the	  target	  is	  a	  private	  company;	  
Public,	  a	  dummy	  variable	  equal	  to	  1	  if	  the	  target	  is	  a	  public	  company;	  Subsidiary,	  a	  dummy	  variable	  equal	  to	  1	  if	  the	  target	  is	  a	  subsidiary;	  Tobin’s	  Q,	  the	  acquirer	  market	  
value	   divided	   by	   the	   acquirer	   book	   value	   of	   assets;	   Run-­‐Up,	   the	  market-­‐adjusted	   buy-­‐and-­‐hold	   return	   of	   the	   acquirer	   from	   day	   –210	   to	   day	   –11	   with	   respect	   to	   the	  
announcement	  date;	  FCF,	  the	  acquirer’s	  operating	  income	  before	  depreciation	  minus	  interest	  expenses	  minus	  income	  taxes	  plus	  changes	  in	  deferred	  taxes	  and	  investment	  
tax	  credits	  minus	  dividends	  on	  both	  preferred	  and	  common	  share	  divided	  by	  the	  book	  value	  of	  total	  assets;	  Leverage,	  the	  acquirer’s	  long-­‐term	  debts	  divided	  by	  the	  market	  
value	  of	  assets,	  defined	  as	   the	  book	  value	  of	   total	  assets	  minus	  common	  equity	  plus	   the	  market	  value	  of	  equity;	  Sigma,	   the	  standard	  deviation	  of	   the	  acquirer	  market-­‐
adjusted	  daily	  returns	  from	  day	  –210	  to	  day	  –11	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  announcement	  date;	  Relative	  Size,	  the	  deal	  value	  divided	  by	  the	  acquirer	  market	  value;	  Relatedness,	  a	  
dummy	  variable	  equal	  to	  1	  if	  the	  bidder	  and	  target	  are	  active	  in	  the	  same	  industry	  (2-­‐digit	  SIC);	  Tender	  Offer,	  a	  dummy	  variable	  equal	  to	  1	  if	  the	  transaction	  is	  classified	  as	  a	  
tender	  offer	  in	  the	  Thomson	  SDC	  database;	  Hostile,	  a	  dummy	  equal	  to	  1	  if	  the	  transaction	  is	  classified	  as	  hostile	  in	  the	  Thomson	  SDC	  database;	  and	  CAR,	  which	  is	  the	  three-­‐
day	  acquirer	  cumulative	  abnormal	  returns.	  For	  dummy	  variables,	  the	  percentages	  correspond	  to	  sample	  proportions.	  





	     
	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	  





Value	   Cash	   Public	   Tobin's	  Q	  
Run-­‐
Up	   FCF	   Leverage	   Sigma	  
Relative	  
Size	   Relatedness	  
Tender	  
Offer	   CAR	  
1990	   273	   104,600	   830,100	   25.27%	   15.38%	   1.87	   1.0408	   7.45%	   14.24%	   3.09%	   42.52%	   56.04%	   2.93%	   0.61%	  
1991	   269	   73,893	   724,600	   21.19%	   15.24%	   1.83	   1.3169	   6.53%	   13.96%	   3.98%	   37.76%	   63.20%	   3.72%	   4.15%	  
1992	   366	   80,195	   668,800	   18.31%	   10.38%	   2.30	   1.1488	   7.41%	   12.16%	   3.68%	   42.87%	   63.11%	   2.19%	   3.16%	  
1993	   519	   119,200	   686,100	   18.11%	   10.21%	   2.04	   1.1572	   6.48%	   14.49%	   3.98%	   38.01%	   60.12%	   1.93%	   3.53%	  
1994	   608	   148,200	   1,022,000	   20.39%	   15.13%	   2.11	   1.0839	   6.86%	   11.37%	   3.52%	   80.45%	   57.07%	   3.29%	   2.32%	  
1995	   707	   191,900	   1,104,000	   20.37%	   17.96%	   2.07	   1.1137	   8.60%	   12.94%	   3.26%	   38.70%	   62.23%	   4.67%	   2.21%	  
1996	   867	   217,100	   1,228,000	   17.88%	   16.49%	   2.42	   1.2098	   8.95%	   13.29%	   3.50%	   30.04%	   59.05%	   3.23%	   2.52%	  
1997	   1067	   217,900	   1,474,000	   18.74%	   15.75%	   2.33	   1.0355	   6.99%	   13.53%	   3.60%	   36.17%	   59.79%	   3.94%	   2.58%	  
1998	   1060	   396,700	   2,138,000	   20.47%	   19.15%	   2.38	   1.0548	   6.53%	   13.50%	   3.56%	   30.14%	   59.06%	   3.11%	   1.61%	  
1999	   881	   635,300	   4,335,000	   19.30%	   21.23%	   2.50	   1.2091	   6.39%	   13.09%	   4.47%	   34.39%	   63.56%	   4.31%	   2.10%	  
2000	   688	   952,800	   5,543,000	   20.78%	   21.51%	   3.01	   1.4635	   4.43%	   12.64%	   4.92%	   30.51%	   62.50%	   5.09%	   -­‐0.19%	  
2001	   539	   492,500	   2,670,000	   23.56%	   20.04%	   2.23	   1.2518	   4.63%	   12.57%	   5.01%	   31.63%	   64.19%	   4.27%	   0.97%	  
2002	   580	   259,000	   2,414,000	   31.90%	   13.10%	   2.04	   1.2373	   3.14%	   12.33%	   4.17%	   20.85%	   64.48%	   3.62%	   1.11%	  
2003	   509	   203,200	   2,014,000	   31.63%	   15.52%	   1.66	   1.3042	   3.83%	   12.75%	   3.64%	   21.50%	   65.62%	   3.54%	   2.05%	  
2004	   590	   317,200	   1,658,000	   40.85%	   12.71%	   2.13	   1.2092	   5.26%	   11.44%	   2.93%	   23.36%	   68.31%	   1.36%	   1.40%	  
2005	   570	   599,400	   4,251,000	   38.25%	   14.91%	   2.19	   1.0624	   7.92%	   11.16%	   2.58%	   22.40%	   66.49%	   1.05%	   1.24%	  
2006	   572	   542,400	   4,543,000	   41.78%	   13.81%	   2.15	   1.0836	   8.08%	   11.08%	   2.46%	   21.13%	   61.36%	   0.87%	   0.87%	  
2007	   590	   387,900	   5,018,000	   42.37%	   14.75%	   2.12	   1.0811	   6.50%	   11.39%	   2.44%	   24.61%	   62.88%	   3.22%	   1.05%	  
2008	   399	   334,600	   2,840,000	   38.85%	   12.28%	   2.02	   1.0448	   6.30%	   12.25%	   3.13%	   35.29%	   65.91%	   3.51%	   0.24%	  
2009	   306	   791,300	   7,074,000	   39.87%	   17.65%	   1.63	   1.1966	   7.01%	   15.15%	   4.71%	   24.99%	   65.69%	   4.58%	   1.95%	  
2010	   366	   545,100	   6,943,000	   42.90%	   16.39%	   1.66	   1.1088	   6.76%	   14.91%	   2.61%	   23.51%	   65.03%	   4.10%	   1.14%	  
2011	   381	   551,300	   4,395,000	   39.37%	   9.97%	   1.82	   1.0853	   8.75%	   13.94%	   2.52%	   22.26%	   61.42%	   1.31%	   0.45%	  
Total	   12,707	   377,277	   2,777,919	   27.11%	   15.99%	   2.19	   1.1557	   6.59%	   12.83%	   3.57%	   32.53%	   62.27%	   3.25%	   1.71%	  
	  






	                





Value	   Cash	   Public	   Tobin's	  Q	  
Run-­‐
Up	   FCF	   Leverage	   Sigma	  
Relative	  
Size	   Relatedness	  
Tender	  
Offer	   CAR	  
1	   4507	   207,200	   1,431,000	   21.77%	   14.56%	   2.33	   1.1441	   3.93%	   10.59%	   4.09%	   45.36%	   60.82%	   2.64%	   2.57%	  
2	   2648	   346,400	   2,193,000	   25.79%	   14.77%	   2.23	   1.1586	   6.83%	   12.22%	   3.68%	   31.66%	   61.86%	   3.29%	   1.84%	  
3	   1675	   342,100	   2,778,000	   27.94%	   16.12%	   2.17	   1.1804	   8.30%	   13.48%	   3.32%	   26.96%	   62.63%	   3.28%	   1.51%	  
4	   1126	   508,500	   3,380,000	   30.28%	   16.34%	   2.07	   1.1605	   8.37%	   13.90%	   3.17%	   21.97%	   63.23%	   3.64%	   1.23%	  
5	   781	   515,900	   3,977,000	   34.19%	   17.29%	   2.04	   1.1733	   9.00%	   15.12%	   3.13%	   23.16%	   66.45%	   4.23%	   0.84%	  
6	   525	   608,600	   4,777,000	   35.05%	   19.24%	   2.06	   1.1507	   9.02%	   15.64%	   2.96%	   19.66%	   62.67%	   3.05%	   0.41%	  
7	   373	   759,300	   5,586,000	   37.80%	   20.64%	   2.00	   1.1723	   9.64%	   16.48%	   2.92%	   18.32%	   65.42%	   3.22%	   0.07%	  
8	   277	   1,339,000	   8,142,000	   35.02%	   22.38%	   1.96	   1.1456	   9.29%	   16.50%	   2.87%	   19.40%	   65.34%	   5.78%	   0.39%	  
9	   201	   491,200	   7,025,000	   38.31%	   17.41%	   1.85	   1.1281	   8.30%	   16.37%	   2.88%	   17.21%	   61.19%	   4.48%	   0.67%	  
10	   140	   390,100	   5,479,000	   35.00%	   19.29%	   1.87	   1.1471	   8.43%	   17.80%	   2.81%	   14.78%	   70.71%	   5.00%	   0.92%	  
more	   454	   588,900	   5,397,000	   34.58%	   20.70%	   1.86	   1.1324	   8.44%	   18.09%	   2.60%	   19.96%	   61.23%	   3.96%	   0.29%	  
	  
	   	  
	  
	  
Table	  2:	  Multivariate	  Analysis	  of	  Acquirer	  CAR	  
Table	  2	  displays	  the	  results	  of	  the	  acquirer	  CAR	  regression	  on	  a	  set	  of	  determinants	  comparable	  to	  Golubov	  et	  
al.’s	   (2015)	   table	   1.	   The	   M&A	   sample	   is	   presented	   in	   Table	   1.	   Column	   1	   is	   obtained	   using	   the	   classic	   OLS	  
estimator.	  In	  column	  2,	  we	  add	  year	  FE,	  and	  in	  column	  3,	  we	  use	  the	  panel	  data	  least	  squares	  dummy	  variable	  
(LSDV)	  estimator,	  combined	  with	  year	  FE.	  Variables	  are	  defined	  in	  the	  Table	  1	   legend	  and	  in	  Section	  1.	  The	  #	  
Observations	   is	   the	   number	   of	   observations,	   adj	   R-­‐square	   is	   the	   adjusted	   R-­‐square,	   FE	   Fisher	   is	   the	   Fisher	  
statistic	   corresponding	   to	   the	   null	   hypothesis	   that	   all	   FE	   jointly	   equal	   0.	   Standard	   errors	   are	   robust	   to	  
heteroskedasticity.	  The	  p-­‐values	  are	  reported	  in	  parentheses,	  under	  the	  corresponding	  coefficients.	  	  
	  
	  	   (1)	   (2)	   (3)	  
Log	  Bidder	  Size	   -­‐0.006	   -­‐0.005	   -­‐0.016	  
	  
(0.000)	   (0.000)	   (0.000)	  
Tobin's	  Q	   -­‐0.002	   -­‐0.002	   0.000	  
	  
(0.018)	   (0.017)	   (0.900)	  
Run-­‐Up	   -­‐0.006	   -­‐0.006	   -­‐0.007	  
	  
(0.003)	   (0.003)	   (0.003)	  
FCF	   0.003	   0.002	   0.000	  
	  
(0.797)	   (0.890)	   (0.986)	  
Leverage	   0.015	   0.016	   -­‐0.030	  
	  
(0.045)	   (0.032)	   (0.066)	  
Sigma	   0.504	   0.613	   0.483	  
	  
(0.000)	   (0.000)	   (0.029)	  
Relative	  Size	   0.002	   0.001	   0.007	  
	  
(0.204)	   (0.213)	   (0.013)	  
Relatedness	   -­‐0.002	   -­‐0.002	   -­‐0.001	  
	  
(0.302)	   (0.305)	   (0.688)	  
Tender	  Offer	   -­‐0.001	   -­‐0.001	   -­‐0.001	  
	  
(0.811)	   (0.884)	   (0.883)	  
Hostile	   -­‐0.005	   -­‐0.007	   -­‐0.015	  
	  
(0.631)	   (0.540)	   (0.276)	  
Public	  x	  Cash	   0.008	   0.008	   0.003	  
	  
(0.058)	   (0.070)	   (0.558)	  
Public	  x	  Stock	   -­‐0.030	   -­‐0.030	   -­‐0.033	  
	  
(0.000)	   (0.000)	   (0.000)	  
Private	  x	  Cash	   0.000	   0.001	   0.002	  
	  
(0.943)	   (0.761)	   (0.469)	  
Private	  x	  Stock	   0.014	   0.012	   0.021	  
	  
(0.002)	   (0.008)	   (0.000)	  
Subsidiary	  x	  Cash	   0.007	   0.007	   0.004	  
	  
(0.005)	   (0.003)	   (0.207)	  
	   	   	   	  #	  Observations	   12,707	   12,707	   12,707	  
R-­‐square	   4.90%	   5.40%	   51.90%	  
adj.	  R-­‐square	   4.80%	   5.20%	   25.14%	  
Year	  FE	   no	   yes	   yes	  
Acquirer	  FE	   no	   no	   yes	  
FE	  Fisher	   -­‐	   -­‐	   1.75	  
	  	   	  	   	  	   (0.000)	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Table	  3:	  Brown	  and	  Warner	  (B&W)	  Simulation	  Results	  with	  a	  Constant	  Number	  of	  Transactions	  
Table	   3	   reports	   results	   of	   the	   Brown	   and	  Warner	   (1985)	   simulation	   results.	   The	   simulation	   procedures	   are	  
described	  in	  Section	  2.	  We	  use	  the	  M&A	  sample	  introduced	  in	  Section	  1	  (see	  Table	  1	  for	  descriptive	  statistics).	  
Panel	   A	   presents	   the	   average	   R-­‐square	   obtained	   by	   estimating	   the	   Table	   2	   regression	   model	   over	   1,000	  
randomly	  selected	  samples	  of	  500	  deals	  (constant	  number	  of	  transactions	  for	  each	  different	  attrition	  pattern),	  
Panel	  B	  provides	  the	  corresponding	  average	  adjusted	  R-­‐square,	  and	  Panel	  C	  offers	  the	  corresponding	  average	  
Fisher	  joint	  significance	  test	  of	  acquirer	  FE	  (with	  percentages	  of	  statistically	  significant	  FE	  tests	  at	  10%,	  5%,	  and	  
1%	   confidence	   levels).	   In	   each	   panel,	   Skills	   is	   the	   standard	   deviation	  𝜎!" 	  of	   the	   Gaussian	   distribution	   from	  
which	   the	   acquirer	   skills	   are	   drawn	   (additional	   abnormal	   returns	   added	   to	   the	   acquirer	   CAR	   around	   the	  
announcement	  date).	  Est	  is	  either	  OLS	  for	  ordinary	  least	  squares	  or	  LSDV	  for	  the	  least	  squares	  dummy	  variable	  
estimator.	  The	  Panel	  attrition	  pattern	  specifies	  the	  form	  of	  attrition	  pattern	  imposed	  on	  the	  selected	  random	  
sample	  (columns	  3–9	  correspond	  to	  patterns	  displayed	  in	  Figure	  1).	  In	  Panel	  C,	  the	  tables	  provide	  the	  FE	  Fisher	  
statistic	  tests	  and	  the	  proportion	  of	  significance	  obtained	  among	  the	  1,000	  randomly	  selected	  samples	  at	  10%,	  
5%,	  and	  1%	  confidence	  levels.	  
Panel	  A.	  R-­‐square	  
	  
Panel	  B.	  Adj.	  R-­‐square	  
	   	  
Panel	  attrition	  pattern	  
Skills	   Est.	   1	   2	   3	   4	   5	   6	   7	  
(0%)	   OLS	   7.83%	   8.06%	   8.01%	   7.80%	   7.93%	   7.75%	   8.01%	  
(0%)	   LSDV	   9.08%	   8.05%	   8.30%	   8.06%	   7.82%	   7.73%	   7.98%	  
(1%)	   LSDV	   10.49%	   8.83%	   8.53%	   8.75%	   8.70%	   8.89%	   8.99%	  
(2%)	   LSDV	   13.81%	   11.34%	   10.82%	   11.24%	   11.21%	   11.28%	   11.58%	  
(3%)	   LSDV	   17.04%	   15.08%	   14.99%	   14.81%	   14.57%	   14.68%	   14.97%	  
(4%)	   LSDV	   21.01%	   19.93%	   19.65%	   19.32%	   19.52%	   19.65%	   19.52%	  
(5%)	   LSDV	   26.13%	   24.98%	   25.02%	   24.64%	   24.59%	   24.70%	   24.37%	  
Panel	  C.	  Fisher	  joint	  significance	  test	  of	  acquirer	  FE	  
Average	  Fisher	  Test	  
	   	  
Panel	  attrition	  pattern	  
Skills	   Est.	   1	   2	   3	   4	   5	   6	   7	  
(0%)	   LSDV	   1.08	   1.01	   1.03	   1.03	   1.00	   1.00	   1.00	  
(1%)	   LSDV	   1.09	   1.07	   1.04	   1.06	   1.07	   1.07	   1.09	  
(2%)	   LSDV	   1.16	   1.17	   1.19	   1.23	   1.24	   1.27	   1.35	  
(3%)	   LSDV	   1.23	   1.35	   1.40	   1.48	   1.52	   1.59	   1.78	  
(4%)	   LSDV	   1.33	   1.62	   1.71	   1.81	   1.95	   2.06	   2.40	  
(5%)	   LSDV	   1.46	   1.96	   2.09	   2.27	   2.46	   2.64	   3.14	  
	  
	   	  
	   	  
Panel	  attrition	  pattern	  
Skills	   Est.	   1	   2	   3	   4	   5	   6	   7	  
(0%)	   OLS	   14.66%	   15.00%	   14.96%	   14.47%	   14.87%	   14.66%	   14.77%	  
(0%)	   LSDV	   74.44%	   38.13%	   34.80%	   31.27%	   29.00%	   27.41%	   24.21%	  
(1%)	   LSDV	   74.83%	   38.65%	   34.97%	   31.78%	   29.68%	   28.31%	   25.05%	  
(2%)	   LSDV	   75.77%	   40.33%	   36.58%	   33.65%	   31.61%	   30.19%	   27.18%	  
(3%)	   LSDV	   76.68%	   42.85%	   39.55%	   36.32%	   34.19%	   32.87%	   29.97%	  
(4%)	   LSDV	   77.79%	   46.12%	   42.87%	   39.68%	   38.01%	   36.78%	   33.72%	  
(5%)	   LSDV	   79.23%	   49.51%	   46.68%	   43.66%	   41.92%	   40.76%	   37.71%	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Percentage	  of	  significant	  Fisher	  Test	  at	  10%	  
	   	  
Panel	  attrition	  pattern	  
Skills	   Est.	   1	   2	   3	   4	   5	   6	   7	  
(0%)	   LSDV	   24.80%	   15.50%	   16.40%	   15.00%	   11.60%	   10.10%	   11.40%	  
(1%)	   LSDV	   27.50%	   21.30%	   16.90%	   19.20%	   17.30%	   18.60%	   18.80%	  
(2%)	   LSDV	   34.70%	   35.70%	   38.90%	   44.40%	   45.40%	   45.60%	   55.30%	  
(3%)	   LSDV	   43.40%	   67.10%	   70.10%	   77.40%	   81.50%	   84.10%	   89.60%	  
(4%)	   LSDV	   56.40%	   90.80%	   92.10%	   95.00%	   97.20%	   97.20%	   99.10%	  
(5%)	   LSDV	   73.00%	   97.50%	   98.80%	   99.00%	   99.80%	   99.70%	   99.60%	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  Percentage	  of	  significant	  Fisher	  Test	  at	  5%	  
	   	  
Panel	  attrition	  pattern	  
Skills	   Est.	   1	   2	   3	   4	   5	   6	   7	  
(0%)	   LSDV	   20.60%	   11.30%	   11.70%	   9.90%	   7.40%	   5.80%	   6.50%	  
(1%)	   LSDV	   21.50%	   13.50%	   10.80%	   11.10%	   10.90%	   11.50%	   10.90%	  
(2%)	   LSDV	   27.00%	   28.60%	   28.30%	   33.00%	   32.40%	   33.20%	   42.30%	  
(3%)	   LSDV	   34.80%	   56.70%	   59.50%	   68.60%	   71.90%	   75.50%	   82.60%	  
(4%)	   LSDV	   47.90%	   86.40%	   87.70%	   91.70%	   94.10%	   95.20%	   98.10%	  
(5%)	   LSDV	   64.70%	   96.60%	   97.70%	   98.50%	   99.60%	   99.50%	   99.60%	  
	  
Percentage	  of	  significant	  Fisher	  Test	  at	  1%	  
	   	  
Panel	  attrition	  pattern	  
Skills	   Est.	   1	   2	   3	   4	   5	   6	   7	  
(0%)	   LSDV	   12.90%	   6.00%	   5.60%	   4.80%	   2.30%	   2.00%	   1.40%	  
(1%)	   LSDV	   12.30%	   7.20%	   4.60%	   5.20%	   4.30%	   3.00%	   1.60%	  
(2%)	   LSDV	   16.30%	   15.00%	   15.30%	   17.00%	   14.50%	   17.40%	   20.30%	  
(3%)	   LSDV	   22.00%	   37.40%	   39.80%	   47.70%	   50.60%	   57.50%	   66.80%	  
(4%)	   LSDV	   33.50%	   74.90%	   76.70%	   83.70%	   86.60%	   89.10%	   94.30%	  
(5%)	   LSDV	   47.40%	   91.20%	   94.60%	   96.70%	   97.10%	   98.50%	   98.90%	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Table	  4:	  Resampling	  Based	  Method	  of	  Detecting	  Acquirer	  Skills:	  Size	  and	  Power	  Analysis	  
Table	  4	  reports	  the	  Brown	  and	  Warner	  (1985)	  simulation	  results	  studying	  the	  size	  and	  power	  of	  a	  Fisher	  joint	  
significance	  test	  of	  acquirer	  FE,	  built	  using	  our	  resampling	  based	  method	  of	  detecting	  acquirer	  skills	  (RBSD).	  The	  
RBSD	  procedure	   is	   introduced	  in	  Section	  5.	  We	  use	  the	  M&A	  sample	   introduced	  in	  Section	  1	  (see	  Table	  1	  for	  
descriptive	  statistics).	  We	  report	  the	  average	  FE	  Fisher	  value	  and	  percentages	  of	  statistically	  significant	  FE	  tests	  
at	   the	   10%,	   5%,	   and	   1%	   confidence	   levels	   obtained	   by	   estimating	   the	   Table	   2	   regression	  model	   over	   1,000	  
randomly	   generated	   samples	   of	   500	   deals.	   Skills	   provides	   the	   standard	   deviation	  𝜎!" 	  of	   the	   Gaussian	  
distribution	   from	   which	   acquirer	   skills	   are	   drawn	   (additional	   abnormal	   returns	   added	   to	   the	   acquirer	   CAR	  
around	   the	   announcement	   date).	   LSDV	   refers	   to	   the	   least	   squares	   dummy	   variable	   estimator.	   Number	   of	  
acquisitions	  is	  the	  number	  of	  transactions	  by	  the	  acquirer	  in	  the	  generated	  random	  sample.	  	  
Panel	  A.	  Average	  Fisher	  value	  
	   	  
Number	  of	  acquisitions	   	  	  
Skills	   Est.	   2	   3	   4	   5	   6	   7	   8	  
(0%)	   LSDV	   1.01	   1.01	   1.01	   1.01	   1.00	   1.00	   1.00	  
(1%)	   LSDV	   1.03	   1.04	   1.04	   1.05	   1.06	   1.07	   1.08	  
(2%)	   LSDV	   1.09	   1.12	   1.16	   1.19	   1.23	   1.27	   1.30	  
(3%)	   LSDV	   1.17	   1.27	   1.35	   1.42	   1.51	   1.58	   1.69	  
(4%)	   LSDV	   1.32	   1.46	   1.62	   1.77	   1.90	   2.06	   2.18	  
(5%)	   LSDV	   1.48	   1.70	   1.96	   2.18	   2.41	   2.65	   2.89	  
	  
Panel	  B.	  Percentage	  of	  significant	  Fisher	  Test	  
10%	  Confidence	  Level	  
	   	  
Number	  of	  acquisitions	   	  	  
Skills	   Est.	   2	   3	   4	   5	   6	   7	   8	  
(0%)	   LSDV	   10.60%	   9.20%	   10.20%	   9.80%	   8.00%	   8.30%	   8.50%	  
(1%)	   LSDV	   11.60%	   14.00%	   15.10%	   15.90%	   15.90%	   17.80%	   18.00%	  
(2%)	   LSDV	   26.00%	   31.70%	   36.90%	   42.30%	   46.90%	   52.40%	   52.20%	  
(3%)	   LSDV	   43.90%	   66.00%	   72.90%	   79.90%	   86.10%	   85.10%	   89.90%	  
(4%)	   LSDV	   75.70%	   90.60%	   94.80%	   97.50%	   98.00%	   99.30%	   99.50%	  
(5%)	   LSDV	   94.50%	   98.40%	   99.60%	   99.70%	   99.90%	   99.80%	   100.00%	  
5%	  Confidence	  Level	  
	   	  
Number	  of	  acquisitions	   	  	  
Skills	   Est.	   2	   3	   4	   5	   6	   7	   8	  
(0%)	   LSDV	   6.00%	   5.10%	   5.60%	   4.20%	   4.40%	   3.60%	   4.70%	  
(1%)	   LSDV	   6.40%	   6.70%	   6.80%	   8.30%	   8.90%	   9.60%	   10.10%	  
(2%)	   LSDV	   16.10%	   20.10%	   25.90%	   29.00%	   34.50%	   37.70%	   38.80%	  
(3%)	   LSDV	   31.00%	   51.00%	   61.30%	   70.80%	   78.10%	   78.90%	   83.40%	  
(4%)	   LSDV	   63.80%	   84.20%	   91.30%	   94.60%	   96.40%	   98.40%	   98.80%	  
(5%)	   LSDV	   88.50%	   97.00%	   98.90%	   99.20%	   99.50%	   99.70%	   99.90%	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1%	  Confidence	  Level	  
	   	  
Number	  of	  acquisitions	   	  	  
Skills	   Est.	   2	   3	   4	   5	   6	   7	   8	  
(0%)	   LSDV	   1.70%	   1.40%	   0.50%	   1.10%	   1.30%	   0.40%	   1.10%	  
(1%)	   LSDV	   1.80%	   1.30%	   1.80%	   1.90%	   2.20%	   2.50%	   2.80%	  
(2%)	   LSDV	   4.90%	   6.20%	   10.20%	   11.60%	   14.30%	   17.00%	   17.90%	  
(3%)	   LSDV	   10.80%	   25.90%	   38.80%	   44.40%	   57.30%	   59.00%	   66.80%	  
(4%)	   LSDV	   39.30%	   64.90%	   77.80%	   87.40%	   89.80%	   92.40%	   93.20%	  
(5%)	   LSDV	   70.40%	   91.10%	   96.40%	   97.60%	   99.00%	   99.30%	   98.60%	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Table	  5:	  Real	  Data	  Set	  Analysis	  
Table	  5	  reports	  the	  results	  of	  our	  resampling	  based	  method	  of	  detecting	  acquirer	  skills	  (RBSD),	  applied	  to	  the	  
real	  M&A	  sample	   introduced	  in	  Section	  1.	  The	  RBSD	  procedure	   is	   introduced	  in	  Section	  5.1.	  Panel	  A	  presents	  
results	   obtained	   using	   our	   baseline	   specification	   (Table	   2),	   Panel	   B	   adds	   the	   previous	   transaction	   CAR	   as	   an	  
additional	  control	  variable	  to	  control	  for	  endogenous	  sample	  attrition,	  and	  Panel	  C	  contains	  only	  the	  subsample	  
of	  acquisitions	  with	  a	  time	  between	  deal	  (TBD)	  inferior	  or	  equal	  to	  24	  months.	  In	  each	  panel,	  the	  average	  Fisher	  
test	   reports	   the	   corresponding	   average	   Fisher	   joint	   significance	   test	   of	   acquirer	   FE.	   The	   percentages	   of	  
significant	  Fisher	  tests	  in	  the	  generated	  samples	  are	  reported	  at	  the	  10%,	  5%,	  and	  1%	  confidence	  levels,	  as	  are	  
the	  percentages	  of	  statistically	  significant	  FE	  tests	  at	  these	  confidence	  levels.	  The	  corresponding	  statistics	  are	  
reported	  by	  the	  sign	  of	  the	  FE.	  Number	  of	  acquisitions	  is	  the	  number	  of	  transactions	  by	  acquirer.	  #Observations	  
is	  the	  number	  of	  observations	  in	  each	  sample.	  #Acquirers	  is	  the	  number	  of	  acquirers	  (FE)	  in	  each	  sample.	  
Panel	  A.	  Baseline	  Specification	  
	  
Number	  of	  acquisitions	  by	  acquirer	  
	  	   5	   6	   7	   8	  
#	  Observations	   3,830	   3,066	   2,652	   2,168	  
#	  Acquirers	   766	   511	   379	   271	  
Average	  Fisher	  value	   1.12	   1.17	   1.20	   1.22	  
Percentage	  of	  Fisher	  value	  significant	  
	   	  10%	   88.20%	   94.70%	   95.40%	   94.20%	  
5%	   73.50%	   83.20%	   87.50%	   83.00%	  
1%	   36.10%	   47.10%	   48.90%	   41.70%	  
	  
Number	  of	  acquisitions	  by	  acquirer	  
	  	   5	   6	   7	   8	  
Average	  percentage	  of	  FE	  significant	  
	   	  10%	   6.23%	   5.46%	   11.91%	   12.63%	  
5%	   3.06%	   2.59%	   6.64%	   7.26%	  
1%	   0.65%	   0.27%	   1.92%	   2.32%	  
Average	  percentage	  of	  FE	  significant	  &	  positive	  
	  10%	   1.98%	   1.98%	   10.90%	   12.16%	  
5%	   0.95%	   0.96%	   6.23%	   7.12%	  
1%	   0.17%	   0.12%	   1.87%	   2.31%	  
Average	  percentage	  of	  FE	  significant	  &	  negative	  
10%	   4.25%	   3.47%	   1.00%	   0.47%	  
5%	   2.11%	   1.63%	   0.41%	   0.14%	  
1%	   0.47%	   0.15%	   0.05%	   0.01%	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Panel	  B.	  Controlling	  for	  Endogenous	  Attrition	  	  
	  
Number	  of	  acquisitions	  by	  acquirer	  
	  	   5	   6	   7	   8	  
#	  Observations	   -­‐	   2,555	   2,196	   1,897	  
#	  Acquirers	   -­‐	   511	   366	   271	  
Average	  Fisher	  value	   -­‐	   1.19	   1.25	   1.20	  
Percentage	  of	  Fisher	  value	  significant	  
	  
	  
10%	   -­‐	   95.60%	   99.00%	   90.70%	  
5%	   -­‐	   89.90%	   95.20%	   74.50%	  
1%	   -­‐	   57.50%	   75.20%	   32.70%	  
	  
Number	  of	  acquisitions	  by	  acquirer	  
	  	   5	   6	   7	   8	  
Average	  percentage	  of	  FE	  significant	  
	   	  10%	   -­‐	   11.36%	   8.68%	   9.22%	  
5%	   -­‐	   5.99%	   4.51%	   5.02%	  
1%	   -­‐	   1.20%	   1.06%	   1.41%	  
Average	  percentage	  of	  FE	  significant	  &	  positive	  
10%	   -­‐	   0.93%	   6.28%	   8.27%	  
5%	   -­‐	   0.64%	   3.46%	   4.69%	  
1%	   -­‐	   0.06%	   0.92%	   1.37%	  
Average	  percentage	  of	  FE	  significant	  &	  negative	  
10%	   -­‐	   10.43%	   2.40%	   0.95%	  
5%	   -­‐	   5.35%	   1.05%	   0.33%	  
1%	   -­‐	   1.15%	   0.14%	   0.04%	  
	  




Panel	  C.	  Controlling	  for	  Time	  Between	  Deals	  	  
	  
Number	  of	  acquisitions	  by	  acquirer	  
	  	   5	   6	   7	   8	  
#	  Observations	   2,760	   2,376	   2,002	   1,600	  
#	  Acquirers	   552	   396	   286	   200	  
Average	  Fisher	  value	   1.13	   1.15	   1.11	   1.10	  
Percentage	  of	  Fisher	  value	  significant	  
	   	  10%	   77.60%	   78.90%	   43.30%	   27.30%	  
5%	   62.10%	   63.00%	   24.10%	   13.40%	  
1%	   27.70%	   25.30%	   4.10%	   1.90%	  
	  
Number	  of	  acquisitions	  by	  acquirer	  
	  	   5	   6	   7	   8	  
Average	  percentage	  of	  FE	  significant	  
	   	  10%	   9.38%	   10.83%	   9.11%	   8.91%	  
5%	   4.76%	   5.69%	   4.65%	   4.69%	  
1%	   1.05%	   1.36%	   1.09%	   1.14%	  
Average	  percentage	  of	  FE	  significant	  &	  positive	  
	  10%	   6.67%	   8.73%	   7.66%	   8.03%	  
5%	   3.52%	   4.75%	   4.09%	   4.35%	  
1%	   0.87%	   1.24%	   1.03%	   1.09%	  
Average	  percentage	  of	  FE	  significant	  &	  negative	  
10%	   2.71%	   2.10%	   1.44%	   0.89%	  
5%	   1.24%	   0.95%	   0.56%	   0.35%	  
1%	   0.18%	   0.12%	   0.06%	   0.05%	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Appendix	  1.	  Brown	  and	  Warner	  (B&W)	  Simulation	  Results,	  Constant	  Number	  of	  Acquirers	  
Appendix	  1	  reports	  the	  results	  obtained	  by	  replicating	  the	  analyses	  for	  Table	  3	  but	  with	  a	  constant	  number	  of	  
100	  acquirers	  for	  each	  attrition	  pattern.	  
Panel	  A.	  R-­‐square	  
	   	  
Panel	  attrition	  pattern	  
Skills	   Est.	   1	   2	   3	   4	   5	   6	   7	  
(0%)	   OLS	   31.53%	   17.07%	   15.41%	   13.79%	   13.03%	   12.32%	   10.98%	  
(0%)	   LSDV	   89.67%	   40.47%	   35.08%	   30.28%	   27.34%	   25.15%	   20.71%	  
(1%)	   LSDV	   89.57%	   41.17%	   35.38%	   31.00%	   28.00%	   26.02%	   21.08%	  
(2%)	   LSDV	   89.96%	   43.11%	   37.59%	   32.73%	   30.02%	   27.76%	   23.16%	  
(3%)	   LSDV	   90.28%	   45.78%	   40.26%	   35.27%	   32.63%	   30.92%	   26.25%	  
(4%)	   LSDV	   90.98%	   48.05%	   42.98%	   39.17%	   36.52%	   34.61%	   30.00%	  
(5%)	   LSDV	   91.65%	   51.48%	   47.17%	   43.26%	   40.65%	   38.88%	   34.85%	  
Panel	  B.	  Adj.	  R-­‐square	  
	   	  
Panel	  attrition	  pattern	  
Skills	   Est.	   1	   2	   3	   4	   5	   6	   7	  
(0%)	   OLS	   10.41%	   8.22%	   8.13%	   7.78%	   7.65%	   7.40%	   7.39%	  
(0%)	   LSDV	   14.16%	   8.27%	   8.22%	   7.60%	   7.52%	   7.29%	   7.43%	  
(1%)	   LSDV	   13.35%	   9.34%	   8.65%	   8.56%	   8.37%	   8.38%	   7.87%	  
(2%)	   LSDV	   16.47%	   12.33%	   11.78%	   10.85%	   10.93%	   10.53%	   10.29%	  
(3%)	   LSDV	   19.40%	   16.44%	   15.56%	   14.22%	   14.25%	   14.44%	   13.90%	  
(4%)	   LSDV	   25.28%	   19.95%	   19.41%	   19.38%	   19.21%	   19.01%	   18.28%	  
(5%)	   LSDV	   30.64%	   25.22%	   25.32%	   24.80%	   24.47%	   24.30%	   23.95%	  
Panel	  C.	  Fisher	  joint	  significance	  test	  of	  acquirer	  FE	  
Average	  Fisher	  value	  
	   	  
Panel	  attrition	  pattern	  
Skills	   Est.	   1	   2	   3	   4	   5	   6	   7	  
(0%)	   LSDV	   1.25	   1.02	   1.02	   1.00	   1.00	   1.00	   1.01	  
(1%)	   LSDV	   1.30	   1.06	   1.04	   1.06	   1.07	   1.07	   1.09	  
(2%)	   LSDV	   1.34	   1.19	   1.20	   1.22	   1.24	   1.26	   1.34	  
(3%)	   LSDV	   1.40	   1.39	   1.43	   1.46	   1.53	   1.60	   1.79	  
(4%)	   LSDV	   1.50	   1.61	   1.69	   1.85	   1.95	   2.05	   2.37	  
(5%)	   LSDV	   1.65	   1.92	   2.11	   2.32	   2.49	   2.67	   3.20	  
	  




Percentage	  of	  significant	  FE	  at	  10%	  
	   	  
Panel	  attrition	  pattern	  
Skills	   Est.	   1	   2	   3	   4	   5	   6	   7	  
(0%)	   LSDV	   18.60%	   14.30%	   15.10%	   12.70%	   11.20%	   10.10%	   10.20%	  
(1%)	   LSDV	   17.50%	   17.60%	   15.90%	   21.40%	   20.30%	   20.70%	   22.40%	  
(2%)	   LSDV	   21.70%	   34.60%	   36.80%	   45.30%	   49.50%	   57.10%	   73.50%	  
(3%)	   LSDV	   24.10%	   63.90%	   71.80%	   78.60%	   86.40%	   92.80%	   98.80%	  
(4%)	   LSDV	   30.00%	   84.40%	   91.80%	   97.50%	   98.80%	   99.80%	   99.90%	  
(5%)	   LSDV	   36.60%	   96.00%	   98.20%	   99.30%	   100.00%	   100.00%	   100.00%	  
	  
Percentage	  of	  significant	  FE	  at	  5%	  
	   	  
Panel	  attrition	  pattern	  
Skills	   Est.	   1	   2	   3	   4	   5	   6	   7	  
(0%)	   LSDV	   10.80%	   9.00%	   10.40%	   8.10%	   7.20%	   6.40%	   6.30%	  
(1%)	   LSDV	   11.60%	   11.60%	   10.70%	   13.80%	   13.40%	   12.30%	   13.90%	  
(2%)	   LSDV	   13.60%	   26.00%	   28.20%	   34.60%	   37.00%	   45.30%	   61.20%	  
(3%)	   LSDV	   15.50%	   52.70%	   60.70%	   70.50%	   80.30%	   87.50%	   97.50%	  
(4%)	   LSDV	   19.00%	   76.50%	   87.30%	   95.50%	   97.60%	   99.00%	   99.90%	  
(5%)	   LSDV	   25.10%	   92.90%	   97.30%	   99.10%	   100.00%	   100.00%	   100.00%	  
	  
Percentage	  of	  significant	  FE	  at	  1%	  
	   	  
Panel	  attrition	  pattern	  
Skills	   Est.	   1	   2	   3	   4	   5	   6	   7	  
(0%)	   LSDV	   2.90%	   4.60%	   5.00%	   4.00%	   3.20%	   2.70%	   1.70%	  
(1%)	   LSDV	   4.50%	   5.50%	   4.20%	   6.30%	   5.30%	   4.40%	   3.90%	  
(2%)	   LSDV	   4.70%	   13.80%	   14.30%	   16.00%	   18.60%	   23.60%	   37.50%	  
(3%)	   LSDV	   5.60%	   33.80%	   41.00%	   50.70%	   63.90%	   72.20%	   91.30%	  
(4%)	   LSDV	   7.90%	   59.10%	   74.70%	   87.60%	   93.40%	   96.00%	   99.60%	  
(5%)	   LSDV	   9.80%	   86.10%	   93.20%	   98.20%	   98.80%	   99.50%	   100.00%	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Appendix	  2.	  Brown	  and	  Warner	  (B&W)	  Simulation	  Results,	  Constant	  Degrees	  of	  Freedom	  
Appendix	  2	  reports	  the	  results	  obtained	  by	  replicating	  the	  analyses	  from	  Table	  3	  but	  with	  a	  constant	  number	  of	  
degrees	  of	  freedom	  for	  each	  attrition	  pattern.	  
Panel	  A.	  R-­‐square	  
	   	  
Panel	  attrition	  pattern	  
Skills	   Est.	   1	   2	   3	   4	   5	   6	   7	  
(0%)	   OLS	   8.78%	   11.93%	   12.62%	   12.58%	   13.02%	   13.03%	   13.55%	  
(0%)	   LSDV	   68.96%	   35.34%	   32.44%	   29.20%	   27.33%	   25.84%	   23.12%	  
(1%)	   LSDV	   69.15%	   36.01%	   32.84%	   29.82%	   27.99%	   26.64%	   23.65%	  
(2%)	   LSDV	   69.92%	   37.88%	   34.69%	   31.55%	   29.99%	   28.43%	   25.67%	  
(3%)	   LSDV	   71.22%	   40.70%	   37.70%	   34.19%	   32.62%	   31.57%	   28.62%	  
(4%)	   LSDV	   72.77%	   43.41%	   40.66%	   38.23%	   36.53%	   35.28%	   32.41%	  
(5%)	   LSDV	   74.61%	   47.17%	   44.94%	   42.27%	   40.64%	   39.34%	   37.12%	  
Panel	  B.	  Adj.	  R-­‐square	  
	   	  
Panel	  attrition	  pattern	  
Skills	   Est.	   1	   2	   3	   4	   5	   6	   7	  
(0%)	   OLS	   6.42%	   7.13%	   7.52%	   7.56%	   7.65%	   7.54%	   7.85%	  
(0%)	   LSDV	   7.35%	   7.26%	   7.54%	   7.46%	   7.50%	   7.45%	   7.88%	  
(1%)	   LSDV	   7.91%	   8.22%	   8.08%	   8.28%	   8.35%	   8.46%	   8.51%	  
(2%)	   LSDV	   10.22%	   10.91%	   10.62%	   10.52%	   10.89%	   10.69%	   10.94%	  
(3%)	   LSDV	   14.12%	   14.96%	   14.74%	   13.99%	   14.25%	   14.61%	   14.47%	  
(4%)	   LSDV	   18.72%	   18.84%	   18.79%	   19.27%	   19.22%	   19.24%	   19.01%	  
(5%)	   LSDV	   24.21%	   24.23%	   24.64%	   24.55%	   24.45%	   24.30%	   24.65%	  
Panel	  C:	  FE	  Fisher	  
Average	  Fisher	  value	  
	   	  
Panel	  attrition	  pattern	  
Skills	   Est.	   1	   2	   3	   4	   5	   6	   7	  
(0%)	   LSDV	   1.04	   1.02	   1.01	   1.00	   1.00	   1.00	   1.01	  
(1%)	   LSDV	   1.05	   1.05	   1.03	   1.06	   1.07	   1.07	   1.09	  
(2%)	   LSDV	   1.09	   1.17	   1.19	   1.22	   1.24	   1.26	   1.34	  
(3%)	   LSDV	   1.17	   1.36	   1.42	   1.46	   1.53	   1.60	   1.79	  
(4%)	   LSDV	   1.27	   1.61	   1.68	   1.86	   1.95	   2.06	   2.38	  
(5%)	   LSDV	   1.41	   1.94	   2.11	   2.31	   2.49	   2.66	   3.22	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Percentage	  of	  significant	  FE	  at	  10%	  
	   	  
Panel	  attrition	  pattern	  
Skills	   Est.	   1	   2	   3	   4	   5	   6	   7	  
(0%)	   LSDV	   30.30%	   17.20%	   15.20%	   14.40%	   10.90%	   10.40%	   9.40%	  
(1%)	   LSDV	   32.00%	   21.50%	   19.00%	   20.80%	   20.10%	   19.30%	   19.70%	  
(2%)	   LSDV	   40.60%	   43.80%	   44.70%	   49.60%	   48.20%	   53.50%	   58.20%	  
(3%)	   LSDV	   57.70%	   78.00%	   80.50%	   83.90%	   86.80%	   90.40%	   94.00%	  
(4%)	   LSDV	   77.80%	   95.50%	   96.50%	   99.10%	   98.90%	   99.60%	   99.70%	  
(5%)	   LSDV	   91.70%	   99.60%	   99.30%	   99.60%	   100.00%	   99.90%	   100.00%	  
	  
Percentage	  of	  significant	  FE	  at	  5%	  
	   	  
Panel	  attrition	  pattern	  
Skills	   Est.	   1	   2	   3	   4	   5	   6	   7	  
(0%)	   LSDV	   24.90%	   12.50%	   10.70%	   10.30%	   7.00%	   6.20%	   4.70%	  
(1%)	   LSDV	   26.30%	   15.00%	   12.90%	   14.30%	   13.50%	   12.40%	   11.00%	  
(2%)	   LSDV	   35.00%	   34.00%	   32.00%	   36.20%	   37.10%	   41.10%	   45.00%	  
(3%)	   LSDV	   51.50%	   70.10%	   72.70%	   74.60%	   80.10%	   84.90%	   88.90%	  
(4%)	   LSDV	   71.40%	   92.90%	   93.40%	   97.50%	   97.70%	   99.20%	   98.90%	  
(5%)	   LSDV	   86.80%	   98.90%	   98.90%	   99.60%	   100.00%	   99.70%	   100.00%	  
	  
Percentage	  of	  significant	  FE	  at	  1%	  
	   	  
Panel	  attrition	  pattern	  
Skills	   Est.	   1	   2	   3	   4	   5	   6	   7	  
(0%)	   LSDV	   15.70%	   6.60%	   5.10%	   4.80%	   3.50%	   2.60%	   0.70%	  
(1%)	   LSDV	   18.90%	   8.00%	   5.60%	   6.80%	   5.30%	   3.70%	   2.40%	  
(2%)	   LSDV	   23.40%	   19.20%	   16.30%	   18.90%	   18.40%	   21.30%	   23.00%	  
(3%)	   LSDV	   38.50%	   51.50%	   54.50%	   57.30%	   63.60%	   67.60%	   74.90%	  
(4%)	   LSDV	   58.90%	   85.10%	   85.70%	   94.10%	   93.50%	   94.80%	   96.40%	  
(5%)	   LSDV	   79.80%	   97.20%	   97.80%	   98.70%	   98.80%	   99.50%	   99.80%	  
(5%)	   LSDV	   63.00%	   95.10%	   94.70%	   95.20%	   96.50%	   96.40%	   96.90%	  
	  
	  
	  
